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Can Joe the Plumber Support
Redistribution? Law, Social
Preferences, and Sustainable
Policy Design
GILLIAN LESTER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

How does one win popular support for laws designed specifically to
redistribute economic wealth? One can hardly gainsay that this is aperhaps the-defining issue for domestic policy in the age of President
Obama. Even as the recent financial crisis has exposed the need for a
reliable social safety net, attempts to respond through the political and
legislative arenas have triggered increasingly hostile responses among
conservatives, populists, Massachusetts voters, and incipient tea
partiers.' The puzzle of how to attract and preserve public support for
law reform aimed at redistribution-of both income and risk-is of no
small significance at this critical juncture of unsettled public sentiment
and a motivated (though perhaps increasingly reticent) presidential
administration.
If this is an issue for the moment, however, it is also an issue for the
ages. Public debates have always been particularly contentious when
they involve redistributional social policy. The questions of how to
spread social risks and who should receive state largesse have, to cite
* Professor of Law, U.C. Berkeley School of Law. For helpful suggestions, I am grateful
to Anne Alstott, Scott Altman, Bobby Bartlett, Matthew Dimick, Dan Farber, Chai
Feldblum, Alan Galloway, David Gamage, Andrew Guzman, Jon Hansen, Allison
Hoffman, Dan Kahan, Greg Keating, Mark Kelman, Randall Kennedy, David Kirp, Chris
Kutz, Adriaan Lanni, Bill Lester, Katerina Linos, Richard McAdams, Martha Minow,
Sachin Pandya, Katherine Porter, Ezra Rosser, Jeff Selbin, Vicki Schultz, Michael Shapiro,
Seana Shiffrin, Bill Simon, Sarah Song, James Spindler, Steve Sugarman, Kirk Stark, Lior
Strahilevitz, Eric Talley, Lucie White, and workshop participants at Berkeley, Chicago,
Connecticut, Harvard, Minnesota, Tel Aviv, Toronto, USC, and Yale Law Schools and the
Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study. Able research assistance was provided by Jack
Jackson, Jonah Lalas, and Elizabeth Ryan. For research support I wish to thank U.C.
Berkeley School of Law, as well as Harvard Law School, where I was Sidley Austin
Visiting Professor of Law during the 2008-2009 academic year.
1 E.g., Michael Luo, Kim Severson, David Herszenhorn & Robbie Brown, Millions
Bracing for Cutoff of Unemployment Checks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 2010, at All (discussing
the partisan gridlock in extending long-term unemployment benefits).
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just a few recent examples, fueled controversies over whether national
health care reform ought to incorporate means testing, that is,
targeted transfers based on low income or means,2 as well as sharp
disagreements over expansions of Medicaid, the federal program that
supplies health insurance to low-income Americans,3 and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), the federal program that
subsidizes health insurance for the children of low-income families. 4
In recent years, a number of scholars from law and the social sciences have advocated expanding social insurance and other aspects of
the "social safety net," with particular attention to the needs of lowincome citizens.5 Much academic work offers compelling normative
arguments for intervention, paired with proposals for law reform.
Nevertheless, the strikingly slow progress of redistributional law re2 See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, Democrats Stung by Dissenters: Unity on Agenda Eludes
Party Leaders, Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 2009, at Al (mentioning recent debates over whether
Medicare drug benefits ought to be means-tested); John Aloysius Farrell, Obama Hides
Medicare Means-Testing in Plain Sight-In his Big Budget, U.S. News & World Rep.,
Thomas Jefferson Street Blog (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.usnews.comlopinion/blogs/johnfarrell/2009/3/9/obama-hides-medicare-means-testing-in-plain-sight-in-his-big-budget.
html.
3 See, e.g., Jim Angle, Health Care Bill Would Strain States by Expanding Medicaid,
Analysts Say, FoxNews.com (Mar. 20, 2010), available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2
010/03/20/health-care-strain-states-expanding-medicaid-analysts-say (discussing opposition to an element of health care reform that would expand Medicaid); Editorial, Health
Reform, the States and Medicaid, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2010, at WK9 (supporting Medicaid
expansion); see also Jeffrey L. Soltermann, Medicaid and the Middle Class: Should the
Government Pay for Everyone's Long-Term Health Care?, 1 Elder L.J. 251 (1993).
4 See, e.g., Jon Ward, Bush Vetoes SCHIP Expansion; Democrats Rally Against "Heartless" Step, Wash. Times, Oct. 4, 2007, at A4 (emphasizing deep ideological divide between
President Bush and Senator Obama with respect to a Democratic bill to increase federal
outlays on SCHIP by roughly $30 billion, with Bush explaining that "[the Democrats']
proposal would result in taking a program meant to help poor children and turning it into
one that covers children in households with incomes of up to $83,000 a year," and Obama
responding that Washington's failure shows "a callousness of priorities that is offensive to
the ideals we hold as Americans"). (The program was formerly known as the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)). The Obama Administration made restoration
of the bill an early legislative priority. See Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Kids Health
Insurance Bill, Political Hotsheet (Feb. 4, 2009, 5:18 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301503544_162-4776308-503544.html (bill authorized spending an added $32.8 billion to expand the health coverage program to include about four million more children).
5 E.g., Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, True Security: Rethinking American Social Insurance 281-305 (1999) (developing a proposal for comprehensive reform of social
provisions using a social insurance model); Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The
Assault on American Jobs, Families, Health Care, and Retirement and How You Can Fight
Back 182-91 (2006) (advocating stronger social protection through a combination of stateprovided social insurance and employer mandates); Katherine V.W. Stone, From Widgets
to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace 243-57 (2004) (describing
changes in the traditional career model of employment and accompanying "[c]ollapse of
the [p]rivate [w]elfare [s]tate"); David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition,
74 Tex. L. Rev. 1601, 1636-43 (1996) (arguing for collectivization of risk through publicbased social insurance pools).
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form during Obama's early years in office suggests that advocates of
such initiatives failed to attend to more practical questions of how
redistributional policies can garner and retain robust public support,
particularly when perceived to redirect resources away from politically-engaged individuals who fear they will emerge economically
worse off (embodied canonically by Joe the Plumber in the 2008
election).6
This Article aims to help provide those pragmatic insights. In particular, it analyzes and compares law reforms that purport to redistribute by targeting benefits at poor individuals through an income or
means test, with those that rely more heavily on "universally" allocated benefits, not conditioned on poverty. I argue that, notwithstanding its more muted effects in the short run, universalist policies
may be more effective at achieving redistribution in the long run due
to greater political durability, and--more intriguingly--by catalyzing
social toleration for redistribution. I support this argument by drawing on the growing body of research in psychology and economics suggesting that people have a mixture of self-regarding and otherregarding impulses, and that some forms of social organization are
more likely than others to elicit pro-social behavior. Universalist programs, I argue, plausibly increase political support for redistribution
by tapping social norms of reciprocity, generating group identity effects based on a sense of common vulnerability, and serving as a "policy frame" that de-emphasizes the salience of low-income people as an
undeserving "out-group." I use a case study of recent social insurance
legislation as a springboard for developing an empirical research
agenda that will help evaluate the strength of this thesis. I further
speculate on whether universal welfare institutions may lead to a kind
of "social learning" that fosters toleration for redistribution in a
deeper way over time.
Although a great deal of legal scholarship concerns itself with questions of inequality and redistribution, the legal academy has largely
overlooked the question of means testing versus universalism. This is
so notwithstanding that it is a key lever of institutional design and an
issue that has long consumed the attention of political scientists, econ6 Joe the Plumber was a moniker that the McCain-Palin campaign bestowed on Joseph
Wurzelbacher, who famously confronted Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential campaign about the perceived deleterious effects that Obama's tax policy would have on his
business. See Larry Rohter, Plumber from Ohio Is Thrust into Spotlight, N.Y. Times, Oct.
16, 2008, at A27. Interestingly, it appeared that Wurzelbacher would likely have been a net
beneficiary of the proposed Obama tax plan. See id.
Although the focus of this Article is support by the mass public, other kinds of political
constraint are also very significant--for example, support by businesses on whom regulations might be imposed, or insurers concerned about their product being crowded out by
state provision.
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omists, and public policy experts. This Article tries to correct this lacuna by analyzing, in depth and from an interdisciplinary perspective,
this policy device that ought to command a key place in the toolkit of
legal scholars and law reformers.
A second contribution of this Article is at the level of theory. Recent years have seen a surge of interest among legal scholars in social
cooperation, particularly in the study of the Internet,7 and the behavioral and cultural mechanisms by which social preferences evolve or
can be "nudged."8 Although existing legal scholarship has begun to
explore applications of these insights, their theoretical development
and policy extensions are far from exhausted. This Article aims both
to extend the grasp of our theoretical understanding of social psychology, social cooperation, and law, and also to extend current legal
scholarship into a new legal arena, that of reforming the social safety
net. As such, it contributes to a lively and growing discourse within
legal scholarship pertaining not only to distributive justice and social
welfare law, but also to tax policy, public finance, legislation, health
law, environmental law, work law, and administrative law.
Third, this Article forms part of a larger project that aims to reorient the legal study of social welfare programs to account for the political impact of legal design. Legal scholarship on problems of
distributive justice has a tendency-understandably, given the challenges of doing careful theoretical work-to stop short of tackling
questions of political feasibility. A familiar refrain-one I myself
have invoked in prior work-is to identify questions of feasibility as
"beyond the scope of this article," or "a task for political actors." This
Article aims less to retrace the normative case for redistribution than
to make the case that such an endeavor cannot stand wholly apart
from pragmatic challenges of cultivating political support and sustainability. Thus my Article may be of interest to, for example, those
who have followed debates over whether redistribution is most efficiently achieved through the income tax or legal rules, not because it
chooses a winner, but because it stresses the additional relevance of
how choice of institution might influence social preferences regarding
redistribution. 9
7 E.g., Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom (2006).
8 E.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 149 (2006).
9 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal
Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71
Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 414 (1981); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the
Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal
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This Article, through analysis and illustration, invites legal scholars
to make use of what social scientists have to say about the emergence
and evolution of social preferences and develop a scholarly, well-informed approach to sustainable legal reform. Understanding the role
that social cooperation can play in building politically sustainable redistributive programs is important, timely, and critical.
From the standpoint of efficacy, the contest between means testing
and universalism as instruments of redistribution would seem to be
over before it has begun. Means testing is, both on its face and by
design, the most direct and administratively efficient way to redistribute resources. Some have argued, however, that universal forms of
provision might actually be more effective in achieving meaningful redistribution. The "paradox of redistribution" theory posits that regimes with more universal provision across economic groups may
achieve greater redistribution and poverty reduction in the long run
because they generate more political support.10 There are a number
of reasons to think this theory is plausible.
"Middle-class"" beneficiaries of a universalist regime might, of
course, exert their political influence on the administration of universal programs to favor the well-off at the expense of the less well-off. 12
Nevertheless, universal provision might still achieve more redistribution than means testing because improvements that benefit the middle
class will in some instances improve the lot of everyone. Some years
ago, a co-author and I critically evaluated special education reforms in
U.S. public education.13 Part of our argument was that middle-class
parents have used their sharp elbows and political clout to direct edu-

Stud. 667 (1994); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for
Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud. 797 (2000).
10 Walter Korpi & Joakim Palme, The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of
Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries, 63
Am. Soc. Rev. 661, 681-82 (1998).
11 This term often remains undefined in discourse about means testing and universalism,
although typically it is used simply to denote those who are in the middle range of the
income distribution and whose income falls above the cut-off point for means-tested benefits. For present purposes, I also use the term in this shorthand way, although it bears
emphasis that there are very difficult conceptual and empirical questions in defining the
"middle class," for example, whether it should be culturally, educationally, occupationally,
or economically defined, whether a sharp line can be drawn between it and adjacent "classes," and so on.
12 For an illustration of this perspective in the legal literature, see, e.g., George J. Stigler,
Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1970).
13 Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester, Jumping the Queue: An Inquiry into the Legal Treatment of Students with Learning Disabilities (1997).
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cational resources towards their own children. 14 Nonetheless, it seems
plain that whether or not it was largely self-interested, that advocacy
effort on the part of middle-class parents succeeded in profoundly increasing public resources-relative to the status quo ante-directed
toward all children with disabilities, even if not in equal measure.' 5
Second, universal provision might increase redistribution by "beneficially" crowding out a system of private and quasi-private welfare
provision that increases economic inequality. Even if universal programs facially redistribute less efficiently than means-tested programs,
in the aggregate they may do a better job because some redistribution
through a universal program is better than no redistribution at all.
Third, and perhaps most intriguingly, I argue that universalism may
cultivate public support in a way that transcends mere strategic "leveraging" of middle- and upper-income citizens' pursuit of their own
egoistic interests. Rather, I explore the possibility that the degree of
universality of a social assistance program might itself influence public
preferences for redistribution. Standard "median voter" accounts of
mass political behavior, grounded in traditional rational choice theory,
have little to say about the potential for policies to shape or alter citizen preferences. Institutionally-oriented theorists within political science, law, and comparative welfare studies, by contrast, believe that
the design of social policies can have a significant influence on the
formation of social preferences. Institutionally-oriented theories,
however, tend to be imprecise about the psychological mechanisms by
which this might occur.
In this Article, I undertake to refine existing accounts of how policies can shape political preferences about redistribution by drawing
upon the growing body of research in psychology and economics suggesting that people have a mixture of self-regarding and other-regarding impulses, and that some forms of social organization are more
likely than others to elicit pro-social behavior. One finding is that
people may be generous, even at personal cost, when participating in a
cooperative enterprise in which they are satisfied that others are re14 Id. at 85-92 (describing relative success of middle- and upper-income parents, as compared with parents of lower socioeconomic status, in securing special educational resources
for their own children in U.S. public schools).
15 See Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 Cornell
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 171 (2005) (arguing that special education laws have increased resources
for children with disabilities, but the superior bargaining sophistication of wealthier parents in negotiating special education plans for their children has produced distributional
inequities); Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154
U. Pa. L. Rev. 789, 794-95, 802-03 (2006) (tracing the massive increase in provision of
public education to children with disabilities, and the profound shift from educating them
in disability-only schools to doing so in regular public schools following passage of special
education laws beginning in the 1960's).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Tax law Review

2011]

CAN JOE THE PLUMBER SUPPORT REDISTRIBUTION?

319

ciprocally cooperating. Second, beliefs about desert, and hence redistribution, are influenced by context and by how an issue is presented.
Third, people tend to be more generous toward others whom they
perceive as belonging to their own group, and identification with a
particular group can be made more or less salient depending on
context.
I argue that programs offering more universal protection against economic insecurity, because all contribute and all might receive benefits, fit more readily with reciprocity ideals than a program that taxes
some citizens and transfers benefits to others. If participants feel that
others are contributing and cooperating, they might more readily tolerate redistribution within the scheme, even at personal cost. 1 6 Conversely, means testing, by making poverty-based group status highly
salient, might undermine public generosity. In targeted programs,
some citizens must be singled out as needy. Public debate over who is
in and who is outside the group that "deserves" benefits might only
sharpen public focus on fraud and abuse at the eligibility margin, and
reinforce the tendency among some people to make sense of the persistence of poverty by attributing blame to those who are needy.
Under a more universal system, boundary questions disappear and
thus poverty-based "out-group" perceptions-and with them, attributions of blame and opportunism that undermine trust in fellow citizens-become less salient. Aspects of identity that all citizens shareanxiety about common life-cycle risks-become more salient. Thus at
minimum, a universalist "policy frame" might reduce barriers to public support of redistributive social policy. Beyond that, however, to
the extent that a more universal beneficiary class perceives itself as
being "in this together" and having a common vulnerability, it is possible that more universalist welfare institutions could facilitate a type of
social learning that alters social preferences in a more stable way over
time, evolving towards greater tolerance of redistribution.
Let me emphasize that I do not mean to advocate the use of
"tricks" from behavioral psychology to mislead citizens into voting for
progressive social policies when they think they are doing otherwise.
16The concept of reciprocity has sometimes been used as a way to justify work requirements or other quid pro quo devices that require recipients of means-tested benefits to
earn their entitlements. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity
Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 257, 291 (2000) (suggesting that an unconditional guarantee of welfare rights
would come into conflict with widely-held notions of reciprocity and fairness); see also
Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from Work, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 373, 445-51 (2006)
(analyzing the analytic foundations of such arguments). My argument takes a different
tack by emphasizing the ways in which universally-allocated benefits can themselves satisfy
reciprocity ideals and in doing so, increase tolerance of redistribution within universal
programs.
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My normative ideal is to design institutions in a way that increases
public tolerance for redistribution without obscuring its existence.
If my thesis is plausible, how might we think about law reform moving forward? Following exposition of my core analytic claims, I sketch
out an illustrative case study of recent legislation in California that
established a program of paid family leave insurance that offers wage
replacement to workers who must take leaves of absence to care for
infants or seriously ill family members. I do not present the illustration as a sample "success story." On the contrary, I believe (and we
should predict) that it is too early to know. Instead, I use it as an
opportunity to think about a research agenda that would help evaluate the strength of my thesis.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets out some operating
definitions to lay the groundwork for my argument. In Part III, I explore economic arguments in favor of universalist provisions. I explain how the standard economics of public finance may supply an
efficiency rationale for universal social risk pooling grounded in correction of information-based market failures. If income redistribution
is the goal, however, conventional economic theory would at least
facially favor targeting. In Part IV, I turn to insights from political
science to show that, efficiency aside, political considerations may
favor universal provision for achieving redistribution. I argue, however, that existing theory on the politics of universalism and wealth
redistribution has failed to offer a sufficiently particularized account
for the motivational underpinnings of this phenomenon. In Part V, I
introduce a parallel literature from psychology and behavioral economics that enriches our understanding of redistributive motivation.
Bringing this literature to bear on the political account from Part IV, I
contend, enables us to think in a more nuanced way about the political
and institutional conditions under which the public might support
redistributional social policy. Part VI illustrates this argument by discussing some specific institutional design dilemmas and explains why
some choices might be better than others for achieving redistribution.
Part VII is a case study testing my thesis. In Part VIII, I push my
thesis further still by considering whether universal welfare benefits
might change attitudes on more than merely a transitory basis, inculcating what is variously referred to as "social solidarity," fellow-feeling, or a sense of collective responsibility. Part IX concludes.
II. DEFINING TERMS
Before I develop my substantive thesis, I must clarify some key
terms. As used in this Article, the term "welfare state" broadly refers
to government intervention in the economy to facilitate provision of
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cash benefits, health care, education, food, housing, and other goods
associated with health and well-being.17 The goal of the welfare state
is in part to enhance the welfare of the poor (including the working
poor), largely through "vertical" redistributive transfers from well-off
citizens to less well-off citizens, and in part to facilitate coordination,
where private markets fail, of risk pools against common social risks
and consumption smoothing across the life-cycle. 18 It is also sometimes argued that a further objective of the welfare state is to enhance
an aspect of community that might be referred to variously as social
cohesion, social solidarity, or a sense of collective responsibility.19
Welfare states may use different mixes of private and public provision, direct and indirect regulation of behavior, cash and in kind benefits, and-of particular importance for this Article-universal and
targeted allocations of benefits. 20 Although the welfare state spans
many different areas of social policy, for example, public education,
housing, and environmental protection, my focus here is the various
institutions that protect income security-"social insurance" in the
broad sense. I make this my focus in part because it is a major aspect
of the welfare state, and in part because I view it as a challenging case,
in some respects, for the ultimate themes I explore about the possibilities for shaping preferences more tolerant of redistribution.
The very broad definition of social insurance offered by Michael
Graetz and Jerry Mashaw is helpful for framing the central trade-off I
evaluate. Graetz and Mashaw define social insurance as a collective
17 A helpful overview is provided in Nicholas Barr, The Economics of the Welfare State
6-13 (4th ed. 2004).
18 Id. at 10-11.
19 The work of T.H. Marshall has been very influential in this regard. See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays 1, 56
(1950) (articulating a role for the welfare state in creating a "common experience" across
classes). More recently, see, e.g., Nicholas Barr, Economic Theory and the Welfare State:
A Survey and Interpretation, 30 J. Econ. Lit. 741, 746-47 (1992) (listing social solidarity as
one among several possible objectives of the welfare state); Neil Gilbert, Transformation of
the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility 157-72 (2002) (reviewing
arguments linking the welfare state with social solidarity).
20 Welfare state intervention can be implemented using a wide variety of actors and
instruments. First the government can directly provide services, for example, education,
cash social assistance (what we generally think of as "welfare"), job training, old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, health insurance, hospitals, and so on. Second, it can impose monetary taxes or subsidies on behaviors to increase or decrease the marginal cost of
specified behaviors, for example, taxes on consumption of cigarettes, alcohol, and gasoline,
and subsidies or tax credits for investments in low-income housing, health insurance, dependent care, mortgage interest, charitable donations, corporate health benefits, and retirement plans. Third, it can regulate behavior directly: prohibit sales of alcohol to minors,
prohibit discrimination in housing and employment, or mandate that employers provide
workers' compensation. Finally, the government may finance private provision, for example the subsidization of private entities that offer prescription drug insurance to disabled
and elderly individuals.
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means for providing income security against a set of common risks
that span the life cycle-youth, old age, illness, disability, death, involuntary unemployment, or illness or infirmity of one's dependents. 21
They include within the scope of this broad definition three kinds of
social provision: (1) means-tested, noncontributory programs, (2)
mandatory contributory (usually wage-financed) programs with benefits calibrated to earnings-what people conventionally mean when
they use the term "social insurance," and (3) voluntary employersponsored pension plans, health insurance, and other fringe benefits
subsidized by government tax expenditures. 22 In this Article, I generally use the term "social insurance" in the conventional sense-to
mean something most closely resembling (2)-although the broader
view is helpful for sorting through the spectrum of social provision
designed to protect income security.
Means- or income-tested programs restrict eligibility to individuals
whose personal or family income is below some threshold. The specific formula for defining the eligibility cut-off differs across programs.
Examples of such programs include Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families23 (TANF, the current manifestation of what was known, between 1935 and 1996, as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or
AFDC 2 4 ), the Earned Income Tax Credit, 25 Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 2 6 (directed at low-income elderly and disabled people),
Medicaid, 27 Food Stamps, 28 Head Start, 29 the National School Lunch
Program, 30 the Special Supplemental Nutritional Program for Women,
Infants and Children,31 and the Housing Choice Voucher Program. 32
These programs are funded by direct expenditures from general tax
revenues, rather than earmarked contributions by beneficiaries.
Many of these programs also condition eligibility on other factors as
well-for example, the presence of children in the family or earned
income.
21 Graetz & Mashaw, note 5, at 56. More precisely, they define social insurance as "collectively determined and legally binding promises to pay defined amounts to or on behalf
of particular beneficiaries given the occurrence or continuation of an event or condition
that impairs the adequacy of current family income." Id. at 57.
22 Id. at 61-62.
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
24 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994) (repealed 1996).
2 IRC § 32.
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f (2006 & Supp. 2009).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396w-2 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
28 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852c (2006 & Supp. 2009).

3o 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769i (2006 & Supp 2009).
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 1786 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
32 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006 & Supp. 2009).
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The key feature of programs conventionally understood to be universal is that eligibility for benefits is not conditioned on income. Eligibility is typically based on a prior record of contributions, and
triggered by some specific contingency, such as unemployment, disability, or retirement after reaching a particular age. The major federal
and state social insurance programs, such as Social Security (a federal
program funded by payroll taxes that provides retirement income, survivors' benefits, and disability coverage for eligible workers and their
dependents) 33 and Medicare (a federal program funded by payroll
taxes and general revenues that provides hospital and medical benefits
for persons age 65 and older and people with certain disabilities), 34
fall in this category.
Having defined these ideal types, let me now clarify that the qualitative comparison of "targeting" to "universalism" risks overstating
the distinction between them. It would be possible, for example, to
characterize means-tested programs as a form of "universal insurance
against experiencing severe poverty" (and moreover we might underestimate the number of citizens or households that at some point will
fall below the means threshold for traditional welfare benefits).35
So, too might we overstate the universality of "universal" provision.
Most programs we ordinarily think of as universal involve some degree of conditionality, for example, a minimal work history for Social
Security benefits. Furthermore, some "universal" programs tend to
be functionally (though not expressly) targeted at middle- and highincome individuals. For example, a substantial portion of government
social spending takes the form of tax expenditures mainly benefiting
higher earners. 36 The beneficiaries of voluntary employer-based
health and welfare programs subsidized by tax expenditures (Cate33 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (2006 & Supp. 2009).

3 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
35 This characterization would be akin to the stylized original position in Rawlsian political thought, where no one knows his place or likely place in society; thus all programs
redistributing resources from the well-off to the less well-off could be considered insurance
against the hypothetical fate of ill-fortune. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 17-19 (2d
ed. 1999).
36 See Christopher Howard, The Hidden Side of the American Welfare State, 108 Pol.
Sci. Q. 403, 413-16 (1993) (concluding that "the middle- and upper-income classes are the
main beneficiaries of the hidden welfare state," citing data showing that federal budget
outlays on tax expenditures in 1990 were roughly one-third of what the government spent
on traditional social insurance and means-tested social programs, and that the tax expenditures subsidizing corporate pensions and health insurance were among the largest in the
U.S. welfare state). For more recent data, reaching similar results, see Leonard E. Burman, Christopher Geissler & Eric J. Toder, How Big Are Total Individual Income Tax
Expenditures, and Who Benefits from Them?, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 79, 82,
tbl.3 (2008) (data showing that tax expenditures in the individual income tax "benefit highincome taxpayers more than low-income taxpayers in absolute terms and relative to their
income, but less relative to the taxes they pay").
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gory (3) in Graetz & Mashaw's definition of social insurance37 ) are
disproportionately salaried, high-earning employees with stable, fulltime jobs.38
While the distinction between means-tested and universal programs
is (like other categorical labels) susceptible to analytic deconstruction,
I would defend the distinction on a number of grounds. First, a narrower, and (by definition) more economically distinct group of citizens actually receives transfers from means-tested programs than
from programs popularly understood as universal such as Social Security and Medicare. And there are programs that occupy points in
between. Thus it is probably most accurate to speak of degrees of
universality, but there are degrees. Second, although we may all, as an
analytic matter, be "insured" against severe poverty, my sense is that
as a cognitive matter, middle- and upper-income Americans fail to
perceive themselves as direct beneficiaries of means-tested welfare
programs because they consider it unlikely that they will fall into severe poverty. For practical purposes, even as they enjoy the benefits
of certain forms of government social spending, better-off citizens will
tend to think of means-tested welfare programs as targeted at people
other than themselves-at people who are currently poor and are
overwhelmingly likely to remain poor. This cognitive distinction between, say, retirement or medical emergencies (events perceived to
happen to most people) and severe poverty (something that happens
.to "poor people," or "disadvantaged people") is, I argue, significant in
itself.
I wish to emphasize two final points before moving on. I argue that
more universalistic social insurance programs may increase progressive redistribution, but of course the devil is in the details. The stringency of eligibility criteria can vary widely, thus influencing the
functional inclusivity of a given program, especially with respect to
those whose attachment to the labor force is more precarious. This, in
turn, will affect the degree to which a given "universal" program is
capable of progressive income redistribution. 39 For reasons I will
elaborate more fully below, expanding universality might require efforts to cover the lowest wage-earners while not severing entirely the
See text accompanying note 22.
38 See Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 73, 100-01 (1998)
(describing the common exclusion of workers from employment-based fringe benefits such
as pensions and health plans on the basis of insufficient past earnings or hours or lack of
sufficient work history with one employer).
39 See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49
UCLA L. Rev. 335, 337-38, 348, 389 (2001) (discussing the stringency of eligibility criteria
for unemployment insurance and its functional effect of excluding many low-wage
workers).
37
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wage-earning link that can help avoid problems of moral hazard that
might otherwise undermine the public legitimacy of the cooperative
enterprise of social insurance.
It also bears emphasis that I do not argue for the elimination of
means-tested programs. Some hazards that are hard to define-incapacities that fall short of disability but impede wage earning, the ill
fortune that may undermine opportunity or erode community or family support systems-may interfere with one's wage-earning capacity
in ways that are difficult or impossible to overcome.40 If expanding
universal programs is successful in facilitating income redistribution to
low-income citizens, we would expect the size of the population that
experiences severe poverty to decline, but that does not mean it will
disappear. There remains an important role for protection of those
who incur risks or hardships that are beyond the grasp of even more
encompassing universal programs.

III.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF UNIVERSAL
SOCIAL INSURANCE

Both economists and political scientists have offered arguments
favoring universal provision of social insurance. In this Part I review
these arguments in turn. An understanding of existing arguments
from both disciplines helps to situate my subsequent arguments as to
the ways in which standard accounts are incomplete, or at least not
specific enough, in explaining the formation of social preferences.
A.

The Efficiency Case for Social Insurance: Overcoming
Market Failures

Mainstream

public

finance

theory

views social

insurance

as

predominantly a mechanism for correcting or surmounting information and collective action problems that impede private risk pooling. 4 1
Redistribution between rich and poor, if it occurs at all, is treated as
largely epiphenomenal. Rather, if vertical redistribution (from rich to
poor) is normatively desirable, it is best accomplished through the use
of targeted transfers conditioned on means. 4 2

Social insurance can be seen as a large-scale version of mutual insurance, a mechanism for protection against uncertain future losses
40 Graetz & Mashaw, note 5, at 64 (describing varieties of difficult-to-categorize hazards
to income adequacy).
41 Barr, note 17, at 116-17.
42 Barr, note 19, at 746, 755 (identifying vertical equity as a possible objective of the
welfare state and distinguishing between "social insurance," which does not in its pure
form seek vertical redistribution, and "social assistance," which does).
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that operates by pooling the resources of individuals who face uncertainty. Pooling makes it possible to estimate the probability of loss in
situations where it may be impossible to determine whether a given
individual will incur a loss. To the extent people tend to be risk
averse, insurance increases social welfare by reducing the psychological burden of uncertainty.
Certain risks, such as illness or unemployment, or loss of wageearning capacity in old age, are common to many people over their
life cycle. Given the potentially unexpected nature of illness and unemployment, an individual (or family) may be unable to accumulate
an adequate savings buffer (and unable to obtain a loan) to absorb the
losses. Insurance in these instances would increase social welfare by
helping both to buffer against income interruptions with unexpected
timing, and to smooth consumption over the life cycle. 43
Competitive insurance markets typically rely on a number of conditions, many of which depend on the availability of accurate information.44 For example, an insurer needs to be able to quantify risk in
order to set an actuarially fair (and therefore efficient) price. The
problem is that certain kinds of social risk factors-such as
macroeconomic shifts that affect unemployment, or technological
changes that affect the costs of health care-can be very difficult to
quantify.
Private insurers also need accurate information about the personal
risk characteristics of potential claimants, for example, how healthy
they are. If there are significant information asymmetries between insurers and consumers, private insurance may be impossible. 45 Suppose, for example, that prospective insurance buyers have
systematically better information about their own health risks, unob43 See, e.g., Zvi Bodie, Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance, 28 J. Econ. Lit. 28
(1990) (describing the insurance function of pension plans).
44 Private market insurance sets the price an individual must pay to participate (the
premium) according to the probability they will incur a loss. Stated formally (and very
simply), the competitive (or "actuarial") insurance premium is n, = p;L + T, where p; is the
probability of the insured event occurring, L is the magnitude of the insured loss, and T is
transaction costs. If accurate information about the factors in the equation cannot be obtained, then it may be impossible to set an efficient price. See generally Steven Shavell,
Economic Analysis of Accident Law 197-98 (1987) (reviewing information problems that
interfere with efficient insurance); J. Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey, 17 J. Econ. Lit. 1375, 1389-91 (1979) (providing a graphical example of the informational problem faced by insurers); Michael
Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on
the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. Econ. 629, 633-37 (1976) (graphically
demonstrating an insurance market based on imperfect information).
45 See generally Mark V. Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The
Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. Econ. 44 (1974) (asserting that
private insurance markets are nonoptimal compared to public provision due to information
asymmetry).
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servable to insurers. This can give rise to a problem of adverse selection. Without means to distinguish between "high-risk" and "lowrisk" consumers, a private insurance provider could charge a premium
that is actuarially competitive on average, effectively presuming the
presence of both high- and low-risk consumers. But such practice
would probably be a poor business strategy because low-risk consumers might balk at that average premium (which implicitly subsidizes
high-risk consumers) and exit the market. If all such individuals were
to exit, the private market provider would realize (at least eventually)
that all its clients were high-risk and raise its premium. The ultimate
outcome (sometimes referred to as "the market for lemons") 46 is that
a private market will supply insurance only to the high-risk individuals
(at an actuarially fair rate for that group), with others-who would
like to be insured, but only at a fair price-inefficiently failing to
purchase insurance.
Another information-based problem that affects insurance markets
concerns private information about actions (that is, moral hazard),
whereby an individual who is fully insured will reduce efforts to avoid
injury (ex ante moral hazard) or to mitigate costs, for example, consumption of health care services, after occurrence of a covered harm
(ex post moral hazard). 47 The insurer's inability to monitor behavior
perfectly means that it is unable to adjust prices to account for the
level of precaution. Consequently, it will charge rates that reflect an
expectation that consumers will (inefficiently) reduce efforts to avoid

loss. 48

Compulsory social insurance can provide the benefits of risk pooling to all who potentially value it more cheaply than private providers
because it obviates the necessity of sorting individuals based on unobservable or only partially observable characteristics and improves the
ability of the insurer to adjust ex post the cost of insurance if there are
unexpected changes in risk of hazard or cost of losses. 49 Compulsory
provision can also address bargaining failures that may impede effi46 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 489-90 (1970) (classic demonstration that where the
quality of used cars cannot be ascertained, sellers with higher quality cars, because they
cannot be fully rewarded, will exit the market leaving behind a "market for lemons").
47 See generally Pauly, note 45, at 54-56. There may also be moral hazard by intermediaries who provide services, for example, a doctor who prescribes more services
than are necessary knowing that the cost of her services will be indemnified by insurance.
48 Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. Econ. 541 (1979) (modeling
the optimal insurance policy, where the cost of insurance factors in the ability of the insurer to observe the level of care by the insured).
49 Similar arguments can be made for the efficiency of compulsory intergenerational
transfers (for example, public pensions) financed either through accumulation of reserves,
or pay-as-you-go financing, whereby current workers finance the pensions of current retirees. Here, state intervention enables efficient life-cycle income smoothing as a buffer
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cient provision such as myopia, signaling problems, collective action
failures on the part of workers, and the like.50 The costs imposed by
moral hazard are more organic to the provision of insurance generally,
and government provision may offer a comparative advantage. Parallel to private insurance, social insurance contains devices designed to
reduce moral hazard, such as copayments, deductibles, and so forth,
but in addition the state may in some spheres be able to monitor and
control behavior directly, backed by civil and criminal laws and attendant investigative and enforcement powers.51
According to standard public finance theory, the major efficiency
risk of public mandates is crowd-out. 52 Where a private market for
goods or services already exists, introduction of universal government
provision at no or reduced cost to public consumers might crowd out
consumption of private goods and lead to a net depletion in supply.
Of course, the private income freed up may be spent on things that
are socially beneficial, and therefore it is possible that universal provision would increase social welfare. However, it is also possible that
wealth or labor substitution effects will occur that reduce social welfare: Some of those whose wealth increases may substitute leisure for
against various risks by virtue of its capacity for a larger mutualization both between and
within age cohorts.
50 For general reviews of the extensive literature on bargaining failures in labor markets,
see Richard Edwards, Rights at Work: Employment Relations in the Post-Union Era
42-76 (1993); Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law 74-78 (1990); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1476-79 (1998); see also
Deborah Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1297-311 (1991) (discussing savings failures caused by myopia, time-inconsistent preferences, and impulsiveness); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443 (1997); Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Antidiscrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 790, 808-09 (1988) (suggesting that rank-and-file employees may place less value
on pension benefits, at the expense of salary, than more highly compensated employees).
51 David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager 5051 (2002). Of course, government provision of insurance may introduce problems of its
own relative to market provision. "Government failure" may arise because neither the
public not elected officials have full information about the actions of agencies and officials;
bureaucrats may be vulnerable to capture by powerful actors or interest groups having a
stake in the design of redistributional policy; agencies and officials may commit errors
given imperfect information about the costs and benefits of various policy choices; or government may become inefficiently large and consequently suffer inertia and inflexibility.
Some also hold the view that freedom is compromised by the paternalism inherent in government-imposed risk pooling, or that citizens will come to over-rely on government for
social welfare at the expense of self-reliance. See generally Barr, note 17, at 755-57; Ayre
Hillman, Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government 775-78 (2d ed. 2009); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry W. Weingast,
Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 203, 208 (1990).
52 Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 218-22 (8th ed. 2008) (giving theory
and illustrations).
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labor and thus reduce productivity. Simultaneously, assuming the
need to balance the budget, more universal provision will require an
increase in marginal tax rates and those who bear the increase may
have reduced incentive to work. If social consumption of a good is
low or nonexistent before government provision, crowd-out of private
market provision is not likely to be significant. Instead, government
intervention might crowd out "self-insurance," that is, private savings,
or reliance on church, family, and friends for social support.53
A key point here is that conventional efficiency-based justifications
for compulsory universal social insurance tend to focus on correcting
market failure rather than on redistribution. True, those who make
claims on the pool receive transfers that those who do not make
claims do not. But from an ex ante perspective, people do not know
whether they will suffer a loss; the decision to join the pool is based on
a rational prediction that the utility from reducing uncertainty equals
or exceeds the cost of membership. It is also true that by mandating
participation by individuals who would exit from a private insurance
market, public insurance effectively redistributes resources from lowrisk to high-risk populations relative to the market. Public pensions,
for example, tend to redistribute resources from young to older generations (assuming pay-as-you-go financing), and from people with short
to long life spans. These forms of horizontal and temporal redistribution may or may not reduce poverty or income inequality, depending
on whether higher-risk people tend also to have low incomes. To the
extent one has the normative goal of vertical redistribution (from rich
to poor), means testing is conventionally viewed as more direct and
efficient.
B.

Target Efficiency

Where redistribution is one's goal, orthodox economic theory
would suggest that means-tested transfer of goods, services, or cash is
the most efficient method. Means-based targeting, however, has its
own inefficiencies, with economists disagreeing on whether they tip
the balance of net efficiency. 54
53 Note that crowd-out is not necessarily undesirable. The state might decide to create
public programs with the goal of inducing "crowd-out" of private insurance in instances
where private provision results in either significant market failure (see above) or significant distributional inequities. If, however, government provides a good at a quality that is
lower or price that is higher than an individual could have obtained by purchasing it privately, there may be a loss of welfare.
54 See generally, Ravi Kanbur & Nick Stern, Transfers, Targeting and Poverty, 2 Econ.
Pol'y 111, 124-25 (1987) (reviewing empirical studies that try to evaluate this question);
Nicholas Rowe & Frances Wooley, The Efficiency Case for Universality, 32 Can. J. Econ.
613 (1999) (arguing that universal provision is more efficient in alleviating poverty than
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For example, efforts to target social transfers toward only low-income citizens are bedeviled by a number of administrative costs. Setting aside questions (having both administrative and normative
dimensions) as to where to draw the eligibility line, how to measure
need, what social unit (for example, individual versus family) ought to
be used for measuring one's resources, and the relevant time period
over which to measure resources and needs, implementation of a
targeted scheme faces certain administrative costs that accompany the
use of an income "cut-off." For example, there can be problems of
both over- and under-inclusiveness. Those who fall above the benefits cut-off may have incentives to conceal information in order to
claim eligibility, giving rise to administrative costs associated with
monitoring "leakage" outside the class of intended beneficiaries. On
the flip side, there may be problems of incomplete take-up of benefits
by intended beneficiaries due to lack of awareness of benefits, administrative difficulties associated with verifying eligibility, and avoidance
of the perceived stigma of collecting benefits.55
Beyond administrative costs, however, perhaps the central efficiency-based case against means-tested transfers as a method for reducing poverty is its potential effect on labor supply. Means testing
functionally imposes a marginal tax rate (the proportion of the last
dollar of income taxed by the government) of 100% on all whose resources fall short of the transfer threshold. 56 The resulting disincentive for program beneficiaries to increase their earnings can lead to a
"poverty trap": To the extent work effort falls, incomes fall, and even
more resources will be required to fill the gap between existing resources and minimal sufficiency. This will mean an even higher tax on
those above the poverty line-which will, in turn, adversely affect
work incentives. The government can try to reduce the implicit marginal tax rate on the poor, but assuming the need to balance the budget,
this requires either reducing the size of the pool that receives transfers, or increasing the tax imposed on the public to pay for the benefit.
The trade-offs here are either fewer people whose poverty is reduced
(due to the lower transfer threshold) or, again, reduced work effort by
those who must pay higher taxes to offset the reduced marginal tax
means testing); Timothy Besley, Means Testing Versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation Programs, 57 Economica 119 (1989) (arguing the opposite).
55 See generally, A.B. Atkinson, Incomes and the Welfare State: Essays on Britain and
Europe 247-55 (1995); Janet Currie, The Take-Up of Social Benefits, in Public Policy and
the Income Distribution 80-148 (Alan J. Auerbach, David Card & John M. Quigley eds.,
2006) (arguing that administrative barriers are more significant than stigma in explaining
incomplete take-up of means-tested benefits).
56 Anthony B. Atkinson, On Targeting Social Security: Theory and Western Experience
with Family Benefits, in Public Spending and the Poor 25, 59-63 (Dominique Van de Walle
& Kimberly Nead eds., 2001).
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rate for the poor. This example is deliberately simple, but sufficient to
illustrate the general point that means-tested redistribution schemes
are susceptible to certain endogenous costs associated with the establishment and maintenance of a benefits cut-off based on income.
In sum, compulsory social insurance may be efficient but need not
be especially redistributive, and means-tested provision may be redistributive in theory, but not especially efficient in practice. Social insurance is capable of vertical redistribution, but whether it achieves a
measure of both efficiency and redistribution depends crucially on the
particularities of institutional design. Analyzed purely as a matter of
economic theory, there may in some cases be a tension between efficiency and redistribution. The economics of social welfare provision,
however, is not the only relevant mode of analysis. The study of politics brings to bear a distinct set of considerations. As Part IV elaborates, political analysis of social welfare institutions may argue in favor
of universal provision for achieving redistribution.
IV.

POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR UNIVERSAL PROVISION

Political theories of why greater redistribution might occur within
more universal regimes fall within several categories. One tradition
hypothesizes that the variety of forms of welfare states reflects cultural differences between nation-states, for example, between the
more "egalitarian" western European democracies and more "individualistic" democracies such as the United States. The argument is that
more egalitarian cultures will choose welfare states that are more encompassing and more redistributional. The absence of a feudal past in
the United States, putative commitment to social mobility, and relative lack of class-consciousness have been offered to explain its parsimonious welfare state.57 In a conceptually similar vein, some
explanations turn on cross-national differences in racial and ethnic
makeup. The relative (at least historically) racial and ethnic homogeneity of western European states has been hypothesized to exert an
important influence on welfare state generosity when compared to the
57 See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (1963); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (1996); Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, Culture,
Context, and the Taste for Redistribution, 3 Am. J. Econ. Pol'y 157 (2011). The "American
exceptionalism" thesis is the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., William F. Forbath,
The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1118-25 (1988)
(conducting an historical analysis to argue that the standard account of the nineteenth
century U.S. labor movement overlooks elements of class-consciousness and radicalism
that ultimately bowed to the triumph of voluntarism in the face of a constraining legal
order).
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United States whose legacy of slavery and progressive waves of immigration have produced a more racially and ethnically divided society.58
Another approach applies median voter models in the rational
choice tradition. Median voter models begin with the assumption that
voter preferences and incentives are aligned around rational self-interest. On this assumption, these models predict that-under various
conditions-policy choices will tend to be "middle of the road" or
moderate, and ignore strong preferences of voters on one side of the
spectrum or the other.59 Where most voters fall within a particular
demographic group or class stratum, policy choices will be dominated
by the middle-of-the road view within that class. 60 This reasoning has
led to the hypothesis, for example, that the "poorer" the median voter
relative to the mean income available for redistribution, the stronger
the median voter's support for higher taxes and social spending. 61 If
the median voter is in the middle of the income distribution, programs
that benefit middle-income voters are both more likely to be created
and more likely to survive than means-tested programs that tax but do
not benefit the middle. One implication of this is the so-called "paradox of redistribution": Although means- testing would appear to be a
58 Alberto Alesina & Edward L. Glaesar, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A
World of Difference (2004); Gary M. Klass, Explaining America and the Welfare State:
An Alternative Theory, 15 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 427, 449-50 (1985); Jill Quadagno, The Color of
Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty 7 (1994).
59 See generally Roger D. Congleton, The Median Voter Model, in Encyclopedia of
Public Choice (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
60 l am setting aside, for simplicity's sake, a number of alternative assumptions, such as
"double-peaked" preferences, multiple- rather than single-issue elections, and the fact that
collective decisionmaking is often mediated by institutions of representative democracy
rather than direct democracy, that can make the model less useful in predicting outcomes.
See id. at 385-86 (noting some theoretical limitations of the median voter model). Moreover, some scholars debate the predictive power of the median voter model as compared
with other rational choice models of preference formation, such as interest-group models.
See, e.g., Sultan Ahmed & Kenneth V. Greene, Is the Median Voter a Clear-Cut Winner?:
Comparing the Median Voter Theory and Competing Theories in Explaining Local Government Spending, 105 Pub. Choice 207 (2000); James R. Baumgardner, Tests of Median
Voter and Political Support Maximization Models: The Case of Federal/State Welfare Programs, 21 Pub. Fin. Rev. 48 (1993).
61 Allan H. Meltzer & Scott F. Richard, A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,
89 J. Pol. Econ. 914 (1981) (arguing that the higher the ratio of the mean to the median
voter's income, the stronger the median voter's support for higher taxes and social spending). Efforts to verify this thesis empirically have produced mixed results. See, e.g.,
Branko Milanovic, The Median Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Test with the Required Data, 16 Eur. J. Pol. Econ. 367 (2000) (finding a strong correlation between income inequality and wealth redistribution, but
questioning whether the median-voter model explains this phenomenon given doubts as to
whether middle-income groups are net beneficiaries of redistribution); Robert Moffitt,
David Ribar & Mark Wilheim, The Decline of Welfare Benefits in the U.S.: The Role of
Wage Inequality, 68 J. Pub. Econ. 421 (1998) (finding a negative, rather than positive,
correlation between income inequality and welfare spending and exploring explanations
within median-voter paradigm).
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more direct and efficient way to redistribute income, the poor may be
better off with universal provision. 62
Middle-class 63 voters might, of course, exert their considerable influence on the administration of universal programs to favor the welloff at the expense of the less well-off.M This might be true, for example, where there is room for regional variation in the quality of services. Even assuming rent-seeking by well-off beneficiaries, however,
redistribution might occur through universal welfare provision in several ways. Some universal benefits will have public goods-like features-public childcare, hospitals, schools, and the like-such that
poor as well as nonpoor citizens will collectively benefit. Nonpoor
citizens, acting in their own interests and having more social capital
than the poor, have an incentive to ensure the programs are high quality. 6 5 Alternatively, it may be practically impossible to prevent "spillover" of benefits to the extent that local actors who administer programs may exercise their discretion in a way that spreads resources
more broadly.66
In weighing concerns about middle-class capture of universal benefits, it is always important to ask the question: "Compared to what?"
The counterfactual can be very difficult to evaluate, especially given
relatively limited state-to-state variations in practice in a number of
areas of social provision, and the limitations of comparability between
nation-states. 67 If the only real choice is between a program that extends benefits to the middle class as well as poor and no program at
all, the former may be preferable from the perspective of distributive
justice. A more realistic comparison in the American context is to an
62 Korpi & Palme, note 10, at 678 (finding negative correlation between degree of welfare state targeting and size of redistributive budget in eleven OECD countries); Walter
Korpi, Approaches to the Study of Poverty in the United States: Critical Notes from a
European Perspective, in Poverty and Public Policy 287-314 (V.T. Covello ed., 1980); Karl
Ove Moene & Michael Wallerstein, Targeting and Political Support for Welfare Spending,
2 Econ. Gov. 3 (2001) (modeling proposition that with self-interested voting, narrow
targeting may so reduce the probability of receiving benefits for the majority that the majority prefers to eliminate benefits altogether).
63 The studies I describe typically use the term "middle class" without defining it. See
note 11 (discussing "middle class" definitional issues).
64 See, e.g., Robert Goodin & Julien LeGrand, Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes
and the Welfare State 210-11 (1987) (arguing that if the middle class is included as beneficiaries of welfare programs they will use their influence to expand services that benefit
themselves and contract services for the poor); Kelman & Lester, note 13.
65 Albert Weale, Equality, Social Solidarity, and the Welfare State, 100 Ethics 473, 484
(1990).
66 Kelman & Lester, note 13, at 97-102 (describing the spill-over, sometimes deliberate,
of the services of special education teachers in mainstreamed classrooms).
67 As noted earlier, empirical efforts to quantify the relative efficiency of poverty reduction of means-tested versus universal social welfare benefits within countries have produced mixed findings. See note 62.
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existing status quo in which middle- and high-income citizens receive
benefits through a system of quasi-private ordering subsidized by tax
expenditures that in turn are financed by general revenues, while lowincome citizens depend on means-tested benefits that are ungenerous,
short-term, and administratively burdensome to qualify for. Given
this, more universal provision might increase redistribution by "beneficially" crowding out a system of private social provision that produces even more income inequality. 68
A third major theoretical tradition views differences through a
structural or "institutional" lens. Perhaps most famous is Gosta Esping-Andersen's three-part typology of welfare regimes. 69 The origins
of different welfare states, in this view, evolved from both struggles
and coalitions between social classes with competing interests.70 Different kinds of alliances between the working class and farmers, the
working and middle classes, and the middle and upper classes led to
different welfare state trajectories in different nations, including with
respect to degrees of universalism and redistribution. 71 A key tenet of
the institutional view is that once in place, these different institutional
structures had a profound impact on the future trajectory of a welfare
state, with more universal schemes tending to cultivate different
"fabrics" of social structure. 72
Although a large literature is devoted to refining Esping-Andersen's typology, it remains widely influential.73 Even within more
nuanced accounts, certain regimes tend to cluster along different
points on the spectrum of level and kind of state involvement in welfare provision, with the United States (along with Canada, Australia,
68 Korpi & Palme, note 10, at 681 (finding more redistribution in regimes where highincome earners receive earnings-related rather than flat-rate benefits, and speculating that
it results from the combination of the appeal for the middle class of earnings-linked benefits and the subsequent crowd-out of even less redistributional private market insurance).
69 Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). This account built on earlier efforts to categorize welfare state types. E.g., Harold Wilensky &
Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (1958).
70 A classic articulation of the "power resource" model is Walter Korpi, The Democratic
Class Struggle (1983).
71 Id; see also Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the
European Welfare State 1875-1975, at 29-30 (1990) (arguing interest group politics explains the
rise of social insurance programs in Europe, where socialists saw an opportunity to buy
political support by including the middle class and the middle class recognized the personal
advantages of security against risk).
72 Esping-Andersen, note 69, at 23-26, 58.
73 See Clem Brooks & Jeff Manza, Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public Opinion in Democracies 21 (2007) (noting the continuing influence of the Esping-Andersen ideal regime-type theory despite vigorous academic debate). An example of an
effort at revision, building upon but refining Esping-Andersen's typology, is Wil Arts &
John Gelissen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report,
12 J. Eur. Soc. Pol'y 137 (2002).
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Ireland, and the United Kingdom) tending towards a "liberal" ideal
type.74 This ideal type is characterized by state encouragement of private social provision, with government provision as a residual strategy,
taking the form of means-tested assistance having strict eligibility requirements and modest benefits, modest universal transfers, and modest social insurance plans.75 The liberal regime-type is contrasted with
the broadly universalistic "social-democratic" regime-type dominated
by the Nordic countries and the hybrid "conservative" or "corporatist" regime of countries such as Austria, France, Germany, and Italy.7 6
Efforts to measure the redistributive effects at the national level of
different ideal regime-types using both longitudinal and cross-national
comparisons have found support for the hypothesis that social-democratic regimes are the most effective in reducing both poverty (raising
the "floor") and inequality (reducing the difference between the top
and bottom) along a range of conventional measures.77
Another institutional line of analysis focuses on "lock-in" following
initial adoption of particular institutional arrangements. Policies may
74 Esping-Andersen, note 69, at 26-27; see also Brooks & Manza, note 73, at 20-21 (also
including New Zealand, Ireland and the United Kingdom in this group). This is sometimes
also referred to as the "residual" regime type.
75 Four-fifths of the money the U.S. government spends on social protection goes to
non-means-tested social insurance schemes, but when compared with most countries, the
United States relies much more heavily on means-tested benefits. Lyle A. Scruggs &
James P. Allan, Social Stratification and Welfare Regimes for the Twenty-First Century:
Revisiting the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 60 World Pol. 642, 652 tbl.3 (2008)
(finding that in 2004 the United States ranked third, behind only Australia and New Zealand, of eighteen OECD countries in percentage of total social spending on means-tested
programs).
76 In the Esping-Andersen typology, the social-democratic ideal type is characterized by
universal social insurance schemes covering a wide swath of both cash and in-kind social
provision, including many services (such as child and elder care) traditionally provided by
the family, benefits graduated according to accustomed earnings, and a purported goal of
"decommodification," or crowding out market provision. The corporatism regime combines state provision of social insurance and occupational fringe benefits with a commitment to the preservation of the traditional family, thus subsidizing women's traditional
roles in the home and significantly limiting state provision of childcare and other services
traditionally performed by the family. Esping-Andersen, note 69, at 27-28. The categories
are, however, not exclusive. For example, within the states generally categorized as "liberal" are some institutions that are quite universalistic, social democratic states that have
not wholly avoided means-testing, and some states elude categorization into one type or
another.
77 See, e.g., Goodin et al., note 75, at 152-86, 260 (finding consistent support for the
regime-type hypothesis using a range of conventional measures of equality and poverty
reduction); Korpi & Palme, note 10, at 677-78 (finding negative correlation between degree
of welfare state targeting and size of redistributive budget in eleven OECD countries); see
also G0sta Esping-Andersen & John Myles, Economic Inequality and the Welfare State, in
Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality (Wiemer Salverda, Brian Nolan & Timothy M.
Smeeding eds., 2009) (stressing the importance of breaking down "ideal-type" welfare regimes into more specified institutional characteristics such as taxation, direct income transfers, and services and calling for further development of this empirical agenda).
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encourage individuals to develop certain kinds of skills, make certain
kinds of investments, and forge certain kinds of social networks that
become "sunk" costs, thus making more difficult the adoption of other
policies that might have been possible at an earlier juncture.78 This
can occur at the level of political elites, who might resist deviation
from existing institutions as a result of existing skills and bureaucratic
infrastructure. 79 It can also operate at the level of mass publics. Political scientist Paul Pierson gives the examples of post-World War II
housing and transportation policies that encouraged particular spatial
patterns of work, consumption, and residence, and Social Security's
pay-as-you-go structure under which each generation becomes deeply
invested in maintaining the existing system so as to avoid the possibility of double payment in the event of a switch to private provision.80
A variant on this view is the "policy-feedback" hypothesis that not
only do interest groups create policy, but policies can create interest
groups. The establishment of a new policy provides resources and incentives for mobilization of political actors and groups, who may come
to define themselves in response to policies and act to reinforce
them.81 Examples are studies tracing the mobilization of veterans as
an interest group in response to civil war pensions, 82 and the effect of
Social Security on the formation of a group identity among older
Americans as "senior citizens" and subsequent creation of lobby organizations such as the AARP (which in turn pressured political parties
to maintain Social Security). 83
Some scholarship in the policy-feedback vein has addressed the
feedback effects of universal versus means-tested benefits. Political
scientist Theda Skocpol has chronicled the failure of a number of
targeted welfare programs in the United States, such as poorhouses,
pensions for poor mothers, and the 1960's and 1970's "war on pov78 Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change, 45
World Pol. 595, 608 (1993).
79 Id. at 603-05 (explaining how policies could influence political elites' development of
administrative skills that in turn make it easier for them to maintain bureaucratic structures created by the initial policy).
80 Id. at 608-09; see also Jacob Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over
Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States (2002).
81 Pierson, note 78, at 599-601.
82 See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of
Social Policy in the United States (1992) (arguing that Civil War pensions led to the selfconscious mobilization of veterans to demand improved benefits).
83 Andrea Louise Campbell, How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and
the American Welfare State (2003); cf. Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law,
29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2685 (2008) (arguing that employment laws that provide minimum
standards or prohibit discrimination can incubate solidarity among workers protected by
those laws and potentially stimulate labor mobilization more generally).
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erty" of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.84 She contrasts these with other programs that have offered benefits across
income groups, such as civil war benefits, health education services for
mothers and babies, and Social Security.85 She argues that programs
targeted at the poor have tended to be politically unpopular, received
low levels of public investment, or suffered public backlash and been
eliminated or scaled back over time, whereas programs with more universal benefits have had greater political success and survival.86 An
important part of Skocpol's argument is that in each of the cases of
universal benefits she studied, there was some progressivity or targeting of benefits within the universal scheme-what she calls "targeting
within universalism"-and yet the programs maintained significant
support from the mass public. 8 7
Andrea Louise Campbell emphasizes the role of political participation in policy feedback, arguing that the effects of universal programs
such as Social Security, Medicare, and the G.I. Bill on political participation tend to be positive, whereas they tend to be negative with
targeted programs like welfare.88 Citing the importance of individuals' material resources to their ability to participate in politics, Campbell argues that the generosity of universal programs like Social
Security and Medicare as compared with targeted welfare programs
significantly explains these effects.89 Furthermore, noting that major
universal programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and the G.I. Bill
have redistributed benefits towards the poor,90 she argues that they
have disproportionately boosted the participation of low-income re84 See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in
Historical Perspective 253-74 (1995).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 253.
87 Id.
88 Andrea Louise Campbell, Targeting, Universalism, and Participation, in Remaking
America: Democracy and Public Policy in an Age of Inequality 121, 123 (Joe Soss, Jacob S.
Hacker & Suzanne Mettler eds., 2007) [hereinafter Remaking America].
89 Id. at 129-30. Campbell also suggests that differences in the way state agents interact
with clients tend to differ in systematic ways-with some exceptions-between universal
social insurance schemes and means-tested programs so as to influence clients' sense of
esteem and efficacy. Id. at 127-28. On this point, see, e.g., Joe Soss, Lessons of Welfare:
Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 363 (1999)
(arguing, in comparing AFDC, Head Start, and Social Security Disability Insurance recipients, that attitudes towards demand-making are shaped by the design of different welfare
institutions and that this has a spill-over effect into their sense of efficacy in the political
sphere more generally).
90 Campbell, note 88, at 129 (noting that low-income Social Security beneficiaries receive higher benefits as a proportion of their preretirement incomes than higher-income
workers, low-income Medicare beneficiaries over a lifetime receive more benefits because
on average they are sicker and less likely to have supplemental insurance, and the G.I. Bill
made more of a difference to World War II veterans from modest backgrounds in providing educational opportunities than it did to more affluent veterans). I consider the com-
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cipients compared with other recipients, thus democratizing participation within client groups.91 At the same time, she argues, the sizeable
benefits that universal programs confer on middle-class and affluent
beneficiaries crucially undergird the programs' overall political support. 92 In sum, Campbell argues, universal programs give both highand low-income beneficiaries "the means and the motive" to participate concerning the programs.93
To draw the strands of this part of my analysis together, one can
give a number of plausible political explanations for why welfare
states with a richer concentration of universal, as compared with
means-tested, welfare programs might be more successful in achieving
meaningful redistribution. Middle-class pressure for improvements to
social programs from which they stand to benefit might "raise all
boats," with those gains inevitably spilling over to the benefit of
others; broader inclusion might increase the resources and incentives
for mobilization of cross-class interest groups that can bring pressure
to bear to preserve their "spoils" and in the process strengthen programs that have progressive features; and social provision of universal
social insurance might beneficially crowd out less egalitarian alternatives. Each of these possibilities, if true, might improve the normative
case for a richer mix of universal, as compared with targeted (either
conditioned on low income, or functionally targeted at middle- and
high-income people through the use of tax-subsidized private-employer-based provision), transfers. These might be reasons enough to
put a thumb on the scale for universal social policies, even if no other
arguments are offered in their defense.
And yet, the purpose of my inquiry-to explore the question of
how a polity might come to politically support social benefits that involve redistribution and also how it might deepen its tolerance for
redistribution over time-brings me to the further question of the relationship between welfare state universalism and the attitudes of the
mass public towards redistribution. A distinct theme, for example, in
Esping-Andersen's work is the idea that different regimes help foster
different attitudes about social justice. 94 If he is right, we would predict that public support for redistribution will vary systematically
across states, with higher support in generous, universalistic, welfare
plex question of progressivity of Social Security and Medicare benefits in more detail in
Part V.
91 Campbell, note 88, at 129.
92 Id. at 129-30.
93 Id. at 130.
94 Esping-Andersen, note 69, at 221-29; see also Brooks & Manza, note 73, at 5-11 (more
recent cross-national data suggesting that social preferences with respect to welfare policy
are at least partly influenced by pre-existing welfare state institutions).
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states and lower support in liberal regimes. Early empirical efforts to
test this hypothesis based on Esping-Andersen's regime-types produced mixed results. 95 More recent efforts have used more finely
specified independent variables (for example, moving away from nation-state ideal types towards specification of policy characteristics),
and dependent variables. These more finely specified studies find a
more consistent positive relationship between universal welfare programs and public support for redistribution. 96
The question is, what underlying mechanisms might explain this
phenomenon assuming it exists? It seems plausible, indeed probable,
that pre-existing "culture" plays a role. At the same time, the evidence discussed earlier of the dialectic relationship between institutions and public behavior suggests that welfare institutions
themselves-including their degree of universality-could influence
the very legitimacy of economic redistribution in the public consciousness. This would be distinct from the spill-over, interest-group mobilization, and beneficial crowd-out phenomena. If indeed public
perception of the legitimacy of spreading economic risks and endowments is endogenous to the design of welfare institutions, how does it
work? Here, there is much speculation, but little specification.
At this point, I turn to a parallel literature from psychology and
economics on altruism, cooperation, and other-regarding behavior.
This area of research enriches our understanding of the micro-foundations of redistributive motivation. Bringing this literature to bear on
institutional theories of welfare-state evolution can help us think in
more nuanced ways about the conditions under which the public
might support redistributional welfare policy, and in particular,
whether the degree of universalism might make a difference.

95 See Mads Meier Jaeger, Welfare Regimes and Attitudes Towards Redistribution: The
Regime Hypothesis Revisited, 22 Eur. Soc. Rev. 157, 157-58 (2006) (reviewing studies).
96 Jason Jordan, Policy Feedback in the Welfare State, An Analysis of Public Support for
the Welfare State in 11 States, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1450187 (finding this relationship when public opinion data disaggregated into distinct
policy sectors, and that these attitudes are independent of broader attitudes towards the
welfare state, suggesting a positive policy feedback effect of universal programs); Christian
Albrekt Larsen, The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support, 41 Comp. Pol. Stud. 145, 146-54 (2008); Jaeger, note 95, at 165
(finding this relationship, but also finding that when regime characteristics are broken
down into still finer subcategories, for example, degree of cash versus in kind benefits, and
level of replacement rate of unemployment benefits, the relationships are less clear-cut);
Katerina Linos & Martin West, Self-Interest, Social Beliefs, and Attitudes to Redistribution: Re-Addressing the Issue of Cross-National Variation, 19 Euro. Soc. Rev. 393 (2003)
(introducing demographic variables and other missing data and finding explanations for
cross-national variation that are more nuanced but still consistent with a regime-type
hypothesis).
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EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS OF OTHER-REGARDING BEHAVIOR

While self-interest remains an important-perhaps the predominant-human motivator, altruism is also a distinct motivation that influences human sociality. 97 This suggests that models of political
preferences may be better able to predict behavior with an enlarged
conception of motivation. In the next Section I discuss selected research on cognitive foundations of pro-social behavior that, if valid,
might lead us to deviate from conventional rational choice predictions
about how the public makes policy decisions, particularly with respect
to redistribution. I focus on three clusters of phenomena that have
particular relevance for the practical problem of designing welfare institutions likely to garner public support: social norms of reciprocity,
empathy-altruism and its connection to in-group favoritism, and beliefs about deservingness and their context-dependency.
At the outset, however, the need for caution is paramount when
moving from laboratory to the realm of social planning. Experimental
studies on motivation can be useful in weeding out bad ideas.98 Which
among ideas that have not been weeded out should guide policy is a
more difficult question and requires an appropriate degree.of modesty
by scholars seeking to marshal experimental insights in the service of
policy design.
Experimental research on other-regarding and pro-social behavior
helpfully illuminates the limits of the assumption of exclusively selfinterested rational agency. Rationality appears to encompass a more
complex utility function than mainstream economic models presume.
Evidence from simple experiments conducted in controlled laboratory
settings suggests that individuals do not always act as they should if
strictly motivated by self-interest. 99 One such experiment is the "ultimatum game." 00 In this game, a pair of subjects, the "proposer" and
97 See generally Jane Allyn Piliavin & Hong-Wen Charng, Altruism: A Review of Recent Theory and Research, 16 Ann. Rev. Soc. 27 (1990); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt,
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism-Experimental Evidence and New
Theories, in 1 Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity 615
(Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006); Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis,
Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytic Foundations, 33
Ann. Rev. Soc. 43 (2007).
98 Colin Camerer & Eric Talley, Experimental Study of Law, in 2 Handbook of Law and
Economics 1619, 1644 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward anAgenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in Behavioral
Public Finance 1, 6-7 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) [hereinafter Behavioral Public Finance].
99 For reviews, see Fehr & Schmidt, note 97; Jolls et. al., note 50, at 1489-93.
100 See Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittenberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 367 (1982); Colin Camerer &
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners, 9 J. Econ Persp. 209
(1995).
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the "responder," must agree on how to divide a sum of money. The
proposer can make one proposal as to how to divide the amount. The
responder then has the choice of whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the responder accepts it, the players divide the money as
proposed. If the responder rejects it, the players forfeit the whole
amount.
If we hypothesize that both players are rational and care only about
maximizing the amount of money they get, and that the proposer
knows that the responder is rational and selfish, we would expect the
proposer to offer the smallest amount of money possible. For the responder, any amount of money is better than no money, and for the
proposer, such an offer will maximize the amount he gets to keep for
himself. This prediction is not borne out. Across hundreds of experiments, the great majority of proposers offer the responder between
40% and 50% of the money.101 Furthermore, offers below 20% are
rejected in 40%-60% of cases. 102 A common interpretation of these
findings, and what responders themselves report, is that responders
reject low offers because they feel hurt by an offer they believe to be
unfair, and are willing to induce forfeiture -even at a cost to themselves-to express their disapprobation.
It is perhaps easier to explain the proposers' behavior in terms of
conventional self-interest. Proposers, anticipating responders' reactions, may be motivated by a self-interested calculation that the responder will reject too low an offer and thus cause forfeiture for both
parties. Experiments that compare the ultimatum game with another
game called the "dictator game" help to test this hypothesis. The dictator game removes the responder's option to reject; the responder
must accept whatever the proposer offers. Self-interest would predict
an allocation of zero, but proposers allocate an average of 10%-25%
to responders. 03 The fact that these allocations are lower than in the
ultimatum game suggests that at least part of the explanation for proposers' generous offers in the ultimatum game is a fear of forfeiture.
But the fact that proposers offer anything at all in the dictator game
suggests that pecuniary self-interest is not the entire explanation. It
seems at least partly motivated by people's desire to abide by social
norms of fairness.104
101Guth et al., note 100, at 371-83.

Id.
Robert Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N.E. Savin & Martin Sefton, Fairness in Simple
Bargaining Experiments, 6 Games & Econ. Behav. 347 (1994).
10 A real-world example given by Robert Sugden is the practice of tipping a taxi driver.
Even in a one-time interaction where we have no chance of seeing the driver again, we
know that the driver expects a tip and that we will feel uneasy if we do not fulfill that
102
103
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Proposal-response experiments have tended to use students as subjects, controlled laboratory settings, and low stakes. This raises questions about the generalizability of the findings. Subsequent research
has found the results robust to fairly large increases in stakes, 05 and
to subjects from varied demographic groups,106 and cultures.107
Some researchers have hypothesized that the results of the ultimatum game reflect bounded rationality leading to mistakes, and that
self-interested actors will learn of their mistakes over repeated games.
Simulation experiments do find convergence towards self-interested
rational actor predictions over repeat games, but if there is learning, it
is very slow indeed; it often takes thousands of iterations before parties' behavior begins to approximate standard predictions-and these
are very simple games.10s
However the fundamental puzzle of the personal utility function
might be resolved, there is a significant accumulation of evidence that
people in fact are willing to help others and that altruism is at least
part of the explanation. It appears, at minimum, that people can have
tastes for redistribution together with tastes for maximizing pecuniary
self-interest, and that the manifestation of these preferences is influenced by social context.
A.

Social Norms of Reciprocity

Another way to characterize the above observations is that a norm
of reciprocity governs and enables coordination in social relations.
Although some forms of reciprocity can be seen as consistent with a
motive of pure self-interest-by doing something to increase the welfare of others, the giver can expect to be rewarded in turn-it is clear
that some reciprocity dynamics incorporate a more complex set of
motivations that include people's willingness to be generous or vengeful in response to others' willingness to abide by norms of fairness and
other moral norms, even where no gains to self can be expected to
result from the reward or punishment behavior.' 09 Trust, or lack of
expectation. Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation, and Welfare 155
(1986).
105 See e.g., Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes in Ultimatum Games: Experimental
Evidence from Indonesia, 37 Econ. Inquiry 47 (1999) (replicating effects using stakes as
high as three months' income).
106 Fehr & Schmidt, note 97, at 626 (reviewing studies).
10 Id. at 626-28 (reviewing studies and finding some cultural variation but substantial
consistency).
108 Id. at 628-29.
109 Scholars from different disciplines have converged on parallel concepts, although
giving them different names. See, e.g., Sugden, note 104, at 159-61 (contrasting tit-for-tat
strategies of experimental game theory based purely in self-interest from conventions of
reciprocity based on a moral ethic of cooperation); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The
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trust, in others' willingness to cooperate appears to be vital to reciprocal cooperation.1 10
The "public goods" game further illuminates the importance of reciprocity and trust. In the basic paradigm, subjects are given an initial
endowment and told they must secretly choose how much of their allotment to contribute to a common pool."' The experimenter then
gives each player an amount proportional to the total contributions to
the pool-for example, the pot might be equally split among participants, or the experimenter can multiply that amount to increase each
player's return. Each subject thus ends up with whatever amount they
kept of their initial endowment plus the additional amount that every
player received. A player will do best by contributing nothing, regardless of what other members of the group contribute. Each person in
the group will do best, however, if everyone contributes their whole
endowment. Experimenters consistently find that although some
players contribute nothing, most people make substantial contributions-on average about half of their endowment in the first round.
Over repeat iterations of the public-goods game, the level of contributions gradually decays. Some have suggested that this is consistent
with simple self-interest: People only learn over time that they will
maximize their gains by contributing nothing. A rival explanation,
however, is that most people hate to feel that others are taking advantage of them, and withholding cooperation on subsequent rounds is a
way to avoid being (or feeling like) a "sucker" once it becomes apparent that others failed to cooperate in previous rounds. 112 In related
fashion, reducing contributions in subsequent rounds is the only pracEvolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogenous Populations, 65 Theoretical Population Biology 17 (2004) (contrasting self-interested forms of cooperation that biologists label reciprocal altruism with a form of norm-enforcement and sharing that they
term "strong reciprocity"); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (2003) (defining the "logic of reciprocity" as the
social process by which when they perceive that others are behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor, altruism, and like dispositions to contribute to public goods even
without the inducement of material incentives); Orjan Widegren, Social Solidarity and Social Exchange, 31 Sociology 755, 762-63 (1997) (distinguishing self-interested "social exchange" from "social solidarity," the latter being characterized by group members'
willingness to promote the interests of the collective, even without expectations of material
gain, provided they perceive similar attitudes among others in the group).
110 Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. Econ.
Persp. 137, 146 (2000).
"I For a review of the literature on public-goods experiments, see Marco Janssen &
T.K. Ahn, Adaptation v. Anticipation in Public-Good Games, available at http://www.allac
ademic.com/metalp64827_index.html; John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in Handbook of Experimental Economics 111-94 (J.H. Kagel & A.E.
Roth eds., 1995).
112 Kahan, note 109, at 73.
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tical way to punish past noncooperaters.xi 3 If the game enables players to punish free-riders without reducing their own contributions in
subsequent rounds, players tend to choose direct punishment, even
when it is personally costly to do So. 1 14 Thus, as in the case of twoplayer proposal-response games, social norms of reciprocity appear to
mediate multi-player cooperative behavior: People's willingness to
contribute depends on their belief that other people are also contributing. Note, with respect to this as well as the other experimental
findings I have discussed in this Part, that the reciprocity dynamic is
self-conscious. People are aware that they are engaged with others in
a mutually cooperative (or noncooperative) interaction, and this
awareness governs their behavior.
A critical question for considering the applicability of these findings
to social welfare policy is how the presence of state regulation (as
compared with the context of pure private charity) might influence
cooperation and generosity. Experimental and field studies have
found that the introduction of motives that rival pure voluntary cooperation, for example, material incentives, can cue people that others
will not spontaneously cooperate, as well as mask and crowd out people's altruistic dispositions. 11 5 If for some people, altruism springs
from their desire to demonstrate (to themselves and others) that they
are willing to sacrifice material gain for the public good, the introduction of material incentives can undermine motivation. 116 Once some
people stop sacrificing for the greater good, reciprocity dynamics may
lead others to stop, and so on, ad infinitum, until the cooperative equilibrium breaks down. This might lead one to conclude that cooperative norms can only evolve in the absence of incentives (or state
mandates). As it turns out, this is not so. The selective use of incentives might actually maximize cooperation. "Targeted retaliation"-a
regulatory system that simultaneously assures the public that most
people are cooperators, but also that the minority of people who are
noncooperators will be penalized-avoids the cueing, masking, and
motivational crowd-out effects associated with across-the-board in-

113 See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 980 (2000) (describing experimental evidence); Bowles &
Gintis, note 109, (describing ethnographic evidence).
114 Fehr & Gaechter, note 113, at 984-86; J. Andreoni, Cooperation in Public Goods
Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 891 (1995).
115Kahan, note 109, at 76-77. A classic demonstration of this situation is Richard M.
Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (Ann Oakley & John
Ashton eds., New Press 1997) (1970) (finding people more willing to donate blood when
asked to volunteer than when offered payment).
116 Kahan, note 109, at 76-77.
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centive regimes, while at the same assuring cooperators that they will
not be exploited.117
In sum, behavior in experimental social dilemmas suggests that people are willing to be generous, even to strangers, and even at personal
cost, and that their generosity is influenced by expectations of others'
cooperation and adherence to social norms.
B.

Empathy-Altruism and In-Group Favoritism

The social psychology literature typically distinguishes between
norms of fairness, which have been the focus of the discussion thus
far, and empathy-altruism."i8 Social norms create a benchmark
against which people judge the actions and motives of others. Empathy-altruism provides no benchmark; instead it provides a partial identification with another's welfare.
Social cognition is made possible through the learned human capacity to take the perspective of others.11 9 Perspective-taking might take
the form of true identification or empathy with another-mentally imagining oneself to be the other-but absent a fair degree of knowledge about the other person, this may be difficult or impossible.120
More commonly, people take the perspective of others by "projection," that is, imagining what oneself would have done and thought if
put in the role of the other.121 As a judgmental heuristic, self-projection enables people to make predictions about others that are often
accurate.122
Both forms of social cognition can give rise to pro-social behavior.
Just as effective responses to others' adherence to social norms drive
individuals to reward or punish them, so too can empathy in response
to the needs or distress of others drive individuals to help (or decline
to help). Here, as before, researchers debate whether what appears to
117 Id. at 79-80 (making this argument), 80-98 (offering examples that include regulating
tax compliance, securing local public support for siting public facilities such as hazardous
waste dumps, and encouraging the sharing of creative ideas and technology); see also Samuel Bowles & Sung-Ha Hwang, Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism
Design when Social Preferences Depend on Incentives, 92 J. Pub. Econ. 1811, 1815-18
(2008) (modeling optimal explicit incentives in the presence of both crowding in and
crowding out, and discussing the example of sanctions for noncooperators in public goods
settings as a way to enhance civic-minded behavior).
118 E.g. Louis IAvy-Garboua, Claude Meidinger & Benoit Rapoport, The Formation of
Social Preferences: Some Lessons from Psychology and Biology, in Handbook of the Economics of Giving, note 97, at 545, 595.
119 Id. at 573-81.
120 Id. at 574.
121 Id. at 574-75.
122 Note, however, that the egocentric foundation of the heuristic may lead people to
overestimate the extent to which others have the same beliefs, the so-called "false consensus effect." Id. at 576.
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be other-regarding behavior truly reflects pure altruism. For example,
voluntarily helping someone in need might reflect a truly empathic,
other-oriented response, or it may reflect an egoistic desire to reduce
personal distress induced by seeing another in distress. 123 Nevertheless, an egoistic explanation of the motivation to relieve others' distress does not explain away the underlying existence of distress at
another's hardship. Regardless of the precise mix of egoism and altruism that drives it, the fact remains that some portion of the population
can be motivated to help others without promise of material reward.
The cognitive mechanism of self-projection carries over to the
group level. "Social identity theory" posits that people's identity is
significantly organized around their membership in salient groups. 124
People are more likely to project onto others who are in their own
social group than they are onto people from different groups.125 Selfanchoring may lead them to reason that similar others will think and
behave more like themselves than dissimilar others.126 The use of the
self-projection heuristic at the group level gives rise to a number of
social phenomena. People perceive more cohesion, expect more reciprocal behavior, and are, in turn, likely to be more generous and cooperative towards members of an in-group. 127
Importantly, social groups can be defined in different ways-they
can be defined narrowly, at the level of classmate or neighborhood, or
more broadly, at the level of nation. Any given person will belong to
multiple groups, and membership in a particular group will have salience in some contexts but not others. This phenomenon can be morally problematic; indeed, much of the literature on groupism has
focused on its role in the formation of racist attitudes. U.S. benevolent societies, which created some of the first forms of social insurance, were premised on the formation of an identity that excluded
those outside the brotherhood of members.128 A key finding of the
research, however, is that group status is mutable: In-group favoritism
can be altered depending on the level at which groups and social cate123 See, e.g., Robert B. Cialdini, Mark Schaller, Donald Houlihan, Kevin Arps, Jim Fultz
& Arthur L. Beaman, Empathy-Based Helping: Is It Selflessly or Selfishly Motivated?, 52
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 749 (1987) (offering experimental data of an egoistic motive
of distress reduction).
124 Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in
Psychology of Intergroup Relations 7, 15-19 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds.,
2d ed. 1986).
125 Jordan M. Robbins & Joachim I. Krueger, Social Projection to Ingroups and Outgroups: A Review and Meta-Analysis, 9 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 32, 38-41 (2005).
126 See Lvy-Garboua et al., note 118, at 589.
127 See id. at 593-94; see Robbins & Krueger, note 125, at 43-44.
128 See generally Brian J. Glenn, Understanding Mutual Benefit Societies, 1869-1960, 26
J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 638, 644-45 (2001).
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gories are made salient. 129 This has important implications for policy,
which I develop in more detail in Part VI.
C.

Beliefs About Deservingness and the Context-Dependency of
Social Preferences

People express stronger support for redistribution if they believe
that the recipient's need is caused by circumstances beyond his or her
control.130 In surveys, people express stronger support for social
transfers if they are told that the recipient's hardship is caused by disability, for example, and less generous if told that the recipient is not
looking for work, or is picky about which work to accept.131 In dictator games, proposers give about three times as much when they are
told the recipient is the American Red Cross than when the subject is
anonymous, and when told the recipient is a welfare recipient, give
significantly more if also told the subject has expressed a strong interest in working than if told the recipient has expressed only a weak
preference for working. 132 Cross-national studies have found a fairly
consistent pattern consonant with the idea that locus of control is important to people. Those deemed most "deserving" across cultures
tend to be the elderly, followed by the sick and disabled, followed by
needy families with children and the unemployed.133 Able-bodied individuals on public assistance are fairly consistently seen as the least
deserving group. 134
Beliefs about the causes of poverty are also important to support
for redistribution. At a societal level, people who believe in structural
explanations (discrimination, bad economy, inadequate schools) or fatalistic explanations (bad luck) for poverty are more likely to support
129 Samuel L. Gaertner, Jeffrey Mann, Audrey Murrell & John F. Dovidio, Reducing
Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of Recategorization, in Intergroup Relations: Essential
Readings 356, 356 (Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams eds., 2001); Penelope J. Oakes, S.
Alexander Haslam & John C. Turner, Stereotyping and Social Reality 147-51 (1994) (reviewing studies on the role of context, or frame of reference, in self-categorization); Robbins & Krueger, note 125, at 42.
130 Jeffry A. Will, The Dimensions of Poverty: Public Perceptions of the Deserving
Poor, 22 Soc. Sci. Res. 312, 329-30 (1993) (polling U.S. subjects); Wim van Oorschot, Who
Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness Criteria and the Conditionality of Solidarity Among the Public, 28 Pol'y & Pol. 33, 38-39 (2000) (polling Dutch subjects, whether the
recipient had control over his needy status was the most significant factor among several in
its influence on support for welfare transfers).
131 Will, note 130, at 329.
132 Christina M. Fong, Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Strong Reciprocity and the
Welfare State, in 2 Handbook of the Economics of Giving, note 97, at 1439, 1448.
133 E.g., Richard M. Coughlin, Ideology, Public Opinion, and Welfare Policy: Attitudes
Toward Taxes and Spending in Industrialized Societies 117-20 (1980); see also Larsen, note
96, at 149.
134 Larsen, note 96, at 149.
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redistributive policies than people who believe poverty is caused by
individual effort (or lack thereof).s35 Psychologists have labeled the
latter construct a belief in a "just world": the idea that people "get
what they deserve and deserve what they get."1 36 Moreover, individuals who have a strong belief in a just world may systematically interpret what they observe so as to preserve this belief, making it difficult
to dislodge.' 37 The literature on this subject is large, but three observations seem particularly relevant to the present inquiry.
First, belief in a just world is not merely a proxy for self-interest.
Personal income influences people's explanations for poverty: Lowincome people are more likely than middle-class people to attribute
poverty to structural factors or luck rather than individualistic factors,
and high-income people have stronger-than-average beliefs in the role
of self-determination.138 The poor are also the strongest supporters of
redistribution, and the well-off its strongest opponents.139 In light of
135 See, e.g., Christina Fong, Social Preferences, Self-Interest, and the Demand for Redistribution, 82 J. Pub. Econ. 225,232, 234 tbl.2 (2001); Gregory Mitchell, Philip E. Tetlock,
Barbara A. Mellers & Lisa D. Ord6fiez, Judgments of Social Justice: Compromises Between Equality and Efficiency, 65 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 629, 635-37 (1993) (finding
that rather than having a stable set of preferences-for example, either egalitarian or meritocratic-experimental subjects' beliefs about how to set an income distribution in a hypothetical society depended on whether they were told that rewards were tightly or loosely
linked with effort in that society).
136 Lauren D. Appelbaum, Mary Clare Lennon & J. Lawrence Aber, When Effort Is
Threatening: The Influence of the Belief in a Just World on Americans' Attitudes Toward
Antipoverty Policy, 27 Pol. Psychol. 387, 390 (2006). See generally Melvin J. Lerner, The
Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (1980); Responses to Victimizations and
Belief in a Just World (Leo Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1998); Roland B6nabou &
Jean Tirole, Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics, 121 Q.J. Econ. 699 (2006);
Claudia Dalbert, Coping with an Unjust Fate: The Case of Structural Unemployment, 10
Soc. Just. Res. 175 (1997); Zick Rubin & Letitia Anne Peplau, Who Believes in a Just
World?, J. Soc. Issues, Summer 1975, at 65.
137 See, e.g., Appelbaum et al., note 136, at 397-98 (using a vignette involving a poor
mother trying to improve her situation, found that survey respondents with a strong belief
in a just world were paradoxically less likely to support public aid for the mother the more
effort she made; authors interpreted this as the participants' effort to reconcile a challenged belief system, that is, a woman who is making efforts but still cannot get ahead);
Charity Scott, Belief in a Just World: A Case Study in Public Health Ethics, Hastings
Center Rep., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 16 (drawing similar conclusions from a case study of negative reader reactions to an Atlanta newspaper article describing a struggling low-income
family that received benefits under Georgia's state children's health insurance program).
See generally B6nabou & Tirole, note 136, at 705-06 (reviewing studies in both laboratory
and natural settings).
138 Heather E. Bullock, Attributions for Poverty: A Comparison of Middle-Class and
Welfare Recipient Attitudes, 29 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 2059, 2066-68 (1999) (finding welfare recipients more likely than middle-class respondents to attribute poverty to structural
rather than individualistic factors); Fong, note 135, at 232-33 (finding high-income sample
of people had stronger average beliefs that self-determination rather than luck causes poverty than the general population).
139 Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics
of Antipoverty Policy 52-54 (1999); Yeheskel Hasenfeld & Jane A. Rafferty, The Determinants of
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these parallels, it seems plausible that beliefs about the causes of poverty, and therefore desert, are simply justificatory constructs that replicate people's underlying self-interested motives with respect to
redistribution.
As it turns out, the correlation between personal income and beliefs
about the causes of poverty is quite imperfect: A large fraction of the
poor oppose income redistribution and a large fraction of the rich support it.140 This implies that people may have beliefs about the causes
of poverty and deservingness that are independent of material selfinterest. One way to test this hypothesis is to measure the strength of
the relationship between people's support for redistribution and their
beliefs about the causes of poverty while controlling for income and
other factors that may be proxies for self-interest. Several studies that
have endeavored to do this have found respondents' beliefs robust to
controls for self-interest. 141 In other words, self-interest alone cannot
explain people's beliefs about the causes of poverty.
Second, the public is heterogeneous in strength of belief in a just
world. Much is made of the fact that in the United States, individualistic, "personal responsibility"-oriented explanations for poverty tend
to prevail over structural or fatalistic explanations.142 However, structural or fatalistic beliefs about the causes of poverty also exist among
Americans, and this may help explain other core commitments AmerPublic Attitudes Toward the Welfare State, 67 Soc. Forces 1027, 1041-42 (1989) (finding
socioeconomically vulnerable groups more likely than others to support means-tested welfare programs and concluding that self-interest plays an important role in welfare
attitudes).
140 Fong et al., note 132, at 1441-42 (reporting based on survey data that 24% of respondents with income of at least $150,000 say that government should "redistribute wealth by
heavy taxes on the rich," and that among respondents with incomes below $10,000 and who,
do not expect their situation to improve in the next five years, 32% say that government
should not redistribute wealth with heavy taxes on the rich, and 23% say that poor people
should help themselves rather than having the government "make every possible effort to
improve the . . . position of the poor").
141 E.g., Giacomo Corneo & Hans Peter Gruner, Individual Preferences for Political
Redistribution, 83 J. Pub. Econ. 83, 106 (2002) (regression analysis of international survey
data consistent with hypothesis that preferences for government redistribution are driven
only partly by selfish pecuniary incentives and that beliefs about the link between individual effort and social standing, as well as social rivalry, also significantly influence preferences); Fong, note 135, at 236-37, 242 (finding highly significant the effect of beliefs about
the role of self-determination and exogenous-determination on poverty on support for redistribution, controlling for income and various other proxies for self-interest), 240-41
(finding these beliefs robust to controls for the incentive effects of taxation).
142 E.g., Joe R. Feagin, Subordinating the Poor: Welfare and American Beliefs 93-97
(1975); James R. Kluegel & Eliot R. Smith, Beliefs About Inequality: Americans' Views of
What Is and What Ought to Be 78 (1986); see also Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser &
Bruce Sacerdote, Why Doesn't the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?, 2
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 187 (2001) (contrasting European and American
beliefs about reasons for poverty and their relationship to attitudes about redistribution).
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icans persistently express-the values of egalitarianism (equality of
opportunity, treatment, and status) and humanitarianism (the belief
that we have an ethical obligation to help those in need).143 Most
Americans hold some mix of these core values, leading to a fundamental ambivalence in forming attitudes about redistribution.14 4 People may feel a desire to help the poor, for example, but also feel that
the poor should take some personal responsibility for overcoming
their misfortune.
Third, people's beliefs about a just world and corollary beliefs about
redistribution are context-dependent. It is well established that people will express different social preferences depending on how an issue is presented or "framed."1 45 Consonant with this phenomenon,
people's preferences may depend on which core values are "activated" or cued when they are asked to make a judgment. References
to "welfare" elicit particularly negative reactions. Martin Gilens, in a
study of U.S. attitudes toward welfare policies, found that most Americans say they favor increased government spending on the welfare
state and think that the government is not doing enough to help the
poor.146 However, when asked about welfare-in particular, meanstested cash transfers to the able-bodied, working-age poor-and "welfare recipients," Americans' attitudes are much more negative.147
Gilens' interpretation of this apparent paradox is that it is driven prin-

143 See Stanley Feldman & Marco R. Steenbergen, The Humanitarian Foundation of
Public Support for Social Welfare, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 658, 673-74 (2001) (contrasting the
effects of egalitarian and humanitarian views on individuals' support of different types of
welfare states).
144 James H. Kuklinski, Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology
364-65 (2001); Erin O'Brien & Joe Soss, Public Opinion, in 2 Poverty in the United States:
An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, and Policy 601, 601-04 (Gwendolyn Mink & Alice
O'Connor eds., 2004); Stanley Feldman & John Zaller, The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 268, 268 (1992).
145 See generally McCaffery & Slemrod, note 98, at 7-12; Thaler & Sunstein, note 7;
Yoram Amiel, Frank Cowell, Liema Davidovitz & Avraham Polovin, Preference Reversals
and the Analysis of Income Distributions, 30 Soc. Choice & Welfare 305 (2008); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the
Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1, 42-43 (2004); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 Am. Psychologist 697, 702-03 (2003)
(describing his research with Amos Tversky in the 1970's and 1980's that illustrated the
effects of framing).
146 Gilens, note 139, at 2. A more recent study found that Americans of all income
levels dramatically underestimate the degree of wealth inequality in the United States, and
when asked to construct an "ideal" distribution, choose a distribution that is much more
egalitarian than the current distribution in the United States. Michael I. Norton & Dan
Ariely, Building a Better America-One Wealth Quintile at a Time, 6 Persp. on Psychol.
Sci. 9 (2011).
147 Gilens, note 139, at 61-67.
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cipally by people's beliefs about the deservingness of the people they
think receive welfare. 148
More particularly, Gilens argues that media discourse on poverty
and welfare in the 1960's created an exaggerated linkage between African-Americans and poverty, and that this media frame remains
highly salient in the American public imagination, powerfully influencing attitudes towards welfare. 149 Today, people overestimate the
proportion of welfare recipients who are African-American, and they
equate African-Americans who receive welfare with a lack of commitment to the work ethic.150 In essence, according to Gilens, people's
beliefs about the deservingness of welfare recipients are associated
with stereotypes about the race of welfare recipients and the work
ethic of African-Americans.' 5 '
Research on the use of opposing media frames in mobilizing public
support (or opposition) finds that on average, support for social
spending is significantly higher when described in ways that emphasize
"responsible economic planning," rather than appealing to people's
compassion and sympathy for the poor.152 Personal narratives of the
able-bodied poor may trigger negative reactions in people who have
strong beliefs in a just world, and who may interpret the person's failure as reflecting a lack of personal responsibility.153 By contrast,
frames that emphasize structural economic challenges facing the nation, values of responsibility, independence, stewardship, and the collective responsibility of the citizenry, have been found effective in
eliciting support for social spending.154
To summarize this Part, people will be generous to others in ways
that cannot always be explained in terms of simple accounts of selfinterest, but their willingness to be generous is conditional on their
belief in others' compliance with social norms, and is influenced by
Id.
149 Id. at 102-32; see also Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television
Frames Political Issues 46-68 (1991) (describing how the ways in which poverty is presented
on television significantly influences the causal attributions viewers make).
150 Gilens, note 139, at 68-69; see also Alesina et al., note 142, at 28-33 (arguing that
Americans' reluctance to support redistributive policies compared with Europeans' is significantly linked with racial heterogeneity in the United States, the racial animosity of
many Americans, and the belief by most Americans that redistribution favors racial
minorities).
151 Gilens, note 139, at 77-79; see also Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame
Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 413, 444-47
(2006) (developing idea of a "blame frame" within which Americans justify racism based
on a combination of belief in a just world and belief that people, including victims, are free
to choose and bear responsibility for their choices).
152 Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating About Poverty and Low-Wage Work: A New
Agenda 15-19 (2007), http://www.inclusionist.org/files/USUKPaper.pdf.
153 See, e.g., Scott, note 137.
154 Nisbet, note 152.
148
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their capacity to empathize or take the perspective of others, by their
belief in the relationship between effort and reward, and by the context in which their preferences are elicited. A key observation is that
people are heterogeneousin the extent and manner in which these different factors influence their motives and beliefs, and thus an important challenge for institutional design, assuming the normative goal of
facilitating vertical redistribution, is to find a way to enable other-regarding preferences to dominate.
In particular, we might take into account:
Reciprocity. Where cooperation is required, cooperation by other
participants matters a great deal to people's willingness to contribute.
The ability to selectively punish (or reward) others based on their
compliance with norms of fairness can facilitate trust and cooperation.
Empathy-Altruism and Groupism. People tend to empathize or

identify more with people they perceive as belonging to their own
group, and will be more generous to people in their own group.
Group identification, however, can cut across many dimensions, and
which dimensions will be most salient at a given time depends on
context.
Beliefs about Deservingness and the Importance of Context. People

express stronger support for redistribution if they believe that the
poverty is caused by circumstances beyond the recipient's control.
People's beliefs about desert, and hence redistribution, are influenced
by context and by how an issue is presented.
VI.

LESSONS FOR PROGRAM DESIGN

This Part considers how we might marshal the richer motivational
account developed in Part V for thinking about program design where
redistribution is one's goal. I do so by further developing the ideas in
the general context of social insurance, and then by offering an extended illustration in one area of current social policy change-paid
family leave-of how we might develop an agenda for research that
would evaluate the validity of my thesis.
If reciprocity theory is correct, individuals' willingness to contribute
to a program depends on the cooperation of other participants (or at

least the perception thereof). People might signal their cooperation
through financial contributions, or by some past behavior that indicates that they have conformed to relevant social norms in a way that
makes them trustworthy. Social insurance, by the very nature of its
facial universality of taxes and spending-most everyone contributes,
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and most everyone can become eligible for benefits 5 5-comports
more readily with reciprocity ideals than a program that taxes some
citizens and transfers benefits to others. Distribution of benefits conditional on low income is more difficult to square with reciprocity ideals absent the incorporation of additional features designed to make
members of the target group "earn" the entitlement to benefits.156
The thesis I wish to advance is that redistribution may be easier to
achieve in some instances if built into a tax-and-transfer scheme that
has reciprocity-like features.
Popular opinion polls consistently find that people prefer payroll
taxes to other kinds of taxes, including income taxes and property
taxes.' 5 7 This arguably flows from the reciprocity-like features of programs financed with payroll taxes. Payroll taxes are structured as a
fixed percentage of earnings, often with a ceiling on the wage base
that is taxed. They typically have an earmarked purpose, thus creating a link (or perceived link) between contribution and benefits that is
lacking with programs financed by direct spending from general revenues.158 Payroll taxes are less progressive than income taxes, how155As noted earlier, a social insurance scheme can be designed in such a way as to make
eligibility difficult (for example, stringent workforce attachment requirements), and this
may be problematic as a matter of equity, especially for those who are involuntarily unemployed or underemployed. See Part II. My point here is that as a facial matter all who
contribute and "play by the rules" (including by staying sufficiently attached to work) are
eligible for benefits, and this relationship of reciprocity within the institutional design is an
important element of its psychological appeal.
156 Wax, note 16, at 270-74 (arguing that proposals advocating unconditional rights to
cash welfare benefits face popular resistance because they run counter to social norms of
reciprocity, and that work requirements satisfy participants' expectation that beneficiaries
are contributing by making an effort to improve their situation).
157 Andrea Louise Campbell & Kimberly J. Morgan, Financing the Welfare State: Elite
Politics and the Decline of the Social Insurance Model in America, 19 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev.
173, 184-85, figs.2 & 3 (2005). To the extent I discuss taxation, I treat it as one side of the
two-sided tax/expenditure coin that is part of any program of social welfare benefits.
There is, however, a rich and sophisticated literature on the psychology and political economy of taxes as a distinct matter, intimately linked with the questions I explore, and part of
the larger conversation about the formation of social preferences of which this Article is a
piece. For a few examples of the literature to which I refer, see Sven Steinmo, Taxation
and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern
State (1993); Harold L. Wilensky, Rich Democracies: Political Economy, Public Policy,
and Performance (2002); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12
Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 106 (2006); Kimberly J. Morgan, Constricting the Welfare State:
Tax Policy and the Political Movement Against Government, in Remaking America, note
88, at 27.
158See, e.g., Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of
Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences 118-25 (1992) (contrasting high and stable public
support over time for spending on Social Security, with consistently low support for spending on welfare, and arguing that an important reason for this is that Social Security "actually or potentially includ[es] most of the population" as beneficiaries); C. Eugene Steuerle
& Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century: Right and Wrong Approaches to Reform 25-27 (1994) (noting that the "earned right" feature of Social Security
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ever-indeed, they may be regressive-not only because of the
absence of progressivity in the rate structure, but also because of the
common (but not universal) practice of capping the taxable wage
base, and the fact that payroll taxes tax only earned income. For this
reason, in a program financed by payroll taxes, any desired progressivity is usually accomplished on the benefits side of the equation. The
ratio of contributions to benefits is a matter of program design and
can lead to more or less progressivity.
Take, for example, the case of Social Security. The payroll tax that
finances the program-while functionally universal-is almost certainly regressive: It imposes a flat tax (around 12%) on payroll,159 but
the marginal tax rate is zero for any wages that exceed the Social Security taxable wage base (of just under $107,000).160 Nonetheless, the
combined tax and benefits structure is progressive. The formula for
calculating Social Security benefits is weighted so that low earners receive a higher proportion of their preretirement earnings than high
earners. 161 In addition, a floor on benefits operates to redistribute to
low earners. 162 The net result is that individuals paying in the bottom
decile of total lifetime Social Security taxes receive about 17% of total
lifetime benefits, while individuals paying in the top decile receive
only about 6% of total lifetime benefits.163 The increased generosity
of Social Security benefits in the post-World War II period had a dramatic effect in reducing poverty among the elderly-a combined result, presumably, of its role in mandating intergenerational crosssubsidies and its progressivity.164
likely increased popular support); Campbell & Morgan, note 157, at 174-75 (arguing that
social insurance programs have proven popular in advanced industrial states because of the
link they create between contributions and entitlement); Paul M. Romer, Preferences,
Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement, in Individual and Social Responsibility: Child
Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America 195, 198-200, 213-17
(Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996) (arguing rational choice assumptions of political preferences
that reflect self-interest cannot fully explain the popularity of social insurance compared
with means-tested transfers, and theorizing that the former's popularity can be explained
by the sense of entitlement that benefits perceived as "earned" give citizens to punish
politicians who attempt to retrench benefits in future periods).
159 IRC H§ 3101(a), 3111(a).
160 U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Fact Sheet: Social Security, 2011 Social Security Changes,
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2011.pdf.
161 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A) (2006).
162 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(C) (2006).
163 Andrew G. Biggs, Mark Sarney & Christopher Tamborini, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., A
Progressivity Index for Social Security, Issue Paper No. 2009-01, 11 tbl.1 (Jan. 2009), http://
www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/issuepapers/ip2009-01.pdf.
16 Gary V. Englehardt & Jonathan Gruber, Social Security and the Evolution of Elderly Poverty, in Public Policy and the Income Distribution, note 55, at 259, 280-82, 285
(analysis finding substantial declines in fraction of elderly households and families below
the federal poverty level between 1967 and 2000 and arguing that it can be explained entirely by increases in Social Security benefits during that time).
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Social Security remains very popular.165 It is possible that the broad
"extensive margin" (that is, reach of participation) of the program has
played an important role in catalyzing mutual support by citizens. It is
also, of course, possible that support for Social Security is premised in
part on citizens' mistaken belief that the program is not actually redistributing income.166 It is noteworthy, however, that until recently, social scientists believed it was more progressive than it is.167 To the
extent that expert beliefs trickle into the public consciousness, the
"false premise" conjecture is weakened. Still, the possibility begs the
overarching normative question of whether I would advocate policies
that achieve redistribution by, in essence, misleading citizens into believing that a program is less redistributional than it is. The answer is
no: To advocate such a position is troubling from the perspective of
democratic legitimacy.
165 See Fay Lomax Cook & Meredith B. Czaplewski, Public Opinion and Social Insurance: The American Experience, in Social Insurance and Social Justice: Social Security,
Medicare, and the Campaign Against Entitlements 251, 258-62 (Leah Rogne, Carroll L.
Estes, Brian R. Grossman, Brooke A. Hollister & Erica Solway eds., 2009) (citing data
from multiple national public opinion polls finding very strong bipartisan support for the
purpose of Social Security despite concern about its solvency).
166 Although researchers have revealed ways in which people misunderstand some aspects of Social Security, I have been unable to find a study that directly tests whether
public support for the program depends on a perception that the program is nonredistributional. Cf. Howell E. Jackson, Accounting for Social Security Benefits, in Behavioral Public Finance, note 98, at 261, 266-75 (arguing that the combination of a confusing benefit
disclosure form and cognitive biases leads Social Security beneficiaries to underestimate
the value of their participation in Social Security and the extent of their benefits).
167 Challenges to an earlier consensus view as to the progressivity of Social Security
have emerged in the past decade. The reexamination was prompted in part by a wellknown study that suggested that simply comparing the replacement rates of wealthy and
poor recipients may be misleading because the greater longevity of wealthy people will
tend to offset their lower replacement rates. See Jeffrey B. Liebman, Redistribution in the
Current U.S. Social Security System, in The Distributional Aspects of Social Security and
Social Security Reform 11, 12 (Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman eds., 2002). However, more recent studies using a broader array of methods and taking into account a range
of offsetting factors-longevity as well as others-suggest that Social Security is still quite
income-redistributional. Biggs et al., note 163; Noah Meyerson & John Sabelhaus, Cong.
Budget Office, Is Social Security Progressive?, Economic and Budget Issue Brief (Dec. 15,
2006), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7705/12-15-Progressivity-SS.pdf; C. Eugene
Steuerle, Adam Carasso & Lee Cohen, Urban Inst., How Progressive Is Social Security
and Why? (May 2004), http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/311016_Straight37.pdf. There
is also a lively debate about the progressivity of Medicare. Compare Kathleen McGarry,
Inter- and Intra-Generational Aspects of Medicare, Gerontological Soc'y of Am. Int.
Group Newsl. (Gerontological Soc'y of Am., Washington, D.C.), Fall 2002 (finding that
Medicare redistributes across groups in a variety of ways but disproportionately benefits
higher-income relative to lower-income individuals), with Jay Bhattacharya & Noshir
Lakdawalla, Does Medicare Benefit the Poor?, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 277, 277, 287-90 (2006)
(arguing that Medicare is an "extraordinarily progressive public program," and that previous research concluding the contrary has used inadequate proxies for economic disadvantage), and Campbell, note 88, at 129 (characterizing Medicare as progressive).
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At the same time, it is not obvious to me that citizen awareness of
the precise distributional features of Social Security or any other universal program is critical to the legitimacy of consent. For example, if
people support redistribution within Social Security because they do
not know where they sit in the distribution-whether they will be beneficiaries or not-their consent is no less legitimate. This Article does
not advance a theory of distributive justice, but many people would
judge as highly legitimate a system in which people supported redistribution behind a proverbial "veil of ignorance" as to whether they
would be a net payer or beneficiary. Another possibility is that people
are unaware of the redistributional features of Social Security simply
because they have stopped scrutinizing where they fall in the distribution. Neither does this strike me as a bad thing. There is a difference
between a person who fails to understand because information is withheld and one who fails to understand because she trusts the system.
People may also have more confidence in a social welfare program
in which cooperation and defection can be monitored, as well as rewarded or punished.168 The kinds of behavior that might serve as a
signal of cooperation would vary depending on the purpose of the
program. An easy example is veterans' benefits, which can be seen as
a reward for past service to one's country. 169 For other programs,
however, ex ante cooperation may be harder to demonstrate and
checks on over-use of benefits therefore might be more important as a
device for satisfying reciprocity norms. Involuntary unemployment,
for example, might easily be mistaken for shirking. Unemployment
insurance benefits are conditioned on a minimal pre-unemployment
work history, proof of discharge without fault, and continuing efforts
by the recipient of benefits to search for a new job.170 These criteria
of initial and continuing eligibility might be intended as proxies, however imperfect, for cooperation with the system of mutual insurance.
Lessons about groupism and framing might also be incorporated
into program design. As noted earlier, group status is mutable and
context-dependent. 171 A person's membership in a particular group
can be made more salient in some contexts, and less so in others. Perceptions of group status, in turn, can influence people's support of
welfare policies. 172 Framing a social problem around risks that are
Bo Rothstein, Social Traps and the Problem of Trust 19-26 (2005).
169See Campbell, note 83, at 130 (providing evidence that recipients of veterans' benefits programs contribute at a greater rate than those of non-means-tested programs).
170 See, e.g., N.Y. Labor Law §§ 591, 593 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2011).
171See note 129 and accompanying text.
172 Gilens, note 139, at 60-79; Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 500, 501 (2001) (finding individuals increase their support for
welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises).
168
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common across income groups-for example, vulnerability to job loss
in a bad economy, risk of unexpected illness, or the difficulty of balancing work and family care-might not only make common life-cycle
risks more salient, but also reduce the salience of perceived "taxpayer" versus "beneficiary" group status.
Designing a program of targeted benefits requires deciding the dual
questions of which citizens belong in the needy group, and how much
they need. Political theorist Bo Rothstein argues that the very act of
deciding these "boundary" questions creates a moral logic that singles
out some citizens as socially inferior, "maladjusted," or "other," and
thereby undermines egalitarian principles. 7 3 Public debate over these
questions can very quickly devolve into questions about which poor
are "deserving" and which are not. 174 Under a more universal system,
by contrast, these boundary questions largely dissolve and the moral
logic changes: "The question becomes not 'how shall we solve their
problem?' but rather 'how shall we solve our common
problem.

.

. ?' "175

Drawing on the analysis in Part IV, Rothstein's "moral logic" might
be reformulated in terms of its cognitive logic: Universal provision
might ameliorate the potentially distorting effects of groupism, related
assessments of deservingness, and distrust-based resistance to forms of
cooperation that might otherwise activate altruism. Recalling that
people are more generous towards people they perceive to be in their
own group, programs that target benefits selectively may dampen
public generosity. The necessity of policing the boundaries of a
means-eligibility threshold could serve to sharpen the public's focus
on "fraud and abuse" by recipients, reinforce the salience of distinctions between taxpayers and beneficiaries, and prime stereotyped beliefs about the beneficiary class and whether they are worthy. Among
those who hold a strong belief in a "just world," debates about who
should receive benefits might cue the cognitive schema by which they
make sense of persistent poverty by attributing blame to people who
cannot seem to overcome it.176
Universal social insurance programs are by definition organized
around a common risk from which they buffer pooled participants.
Thus, for example, the need for income continuity when illness or
caregiving disrupt work can be understood not as a poor people's
problem, nor an old people's problem, nor a young family's problem,
173 Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State 158-60 (1998).
174 Id. at 159.
175 Id. at 160.
176 See Larsen, note 96, at 152 (arguing that selective benefits make more salient who

benefits from the welfare state and who loses).
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nor a women's problem-but as a basic human challenge everyone
faces, if not now, then some time in their lives.' 77 Insofar as redistribution might occur within universal programs, such redistribution
would alleviate some of the burden on means-tested programs to combat poverty, and thus produce the double effect of also reducing the
number of people vulnerable to categorization as "undeserving" in the
collective imagination.
The state of the economy can also serve as a frame that triggers
context-dependent beliefs about deservingness. Support for welfare
spending tends to increase in economic recessions. 178 This may be because more people start to feel as though they could end up needing
public support, but beliefs about deservingness are likely also at
play. 179 When the economy prospers, people tend to blame poverty
on the poor for not trying hard enough and when times are bad, people are more likely to attribute poverty to factors beyond people's
control.o80 Emphasizing the current widespread perception of a need
for buffers against larger structural forces that might lead to economic
insecurity-the recent financial crisis would be an excellent example-can draw the perceiver's attention away from vulnerable groups
who potentially might be seen to have brought misfortune upon themselves, and direct it towards vulnerabilities that cut across class, race,
and generation.
VII.

AN ILLUSTRATION:

PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA

Let me turn, then, to an illustration based on current policy developments that might sharpen the focus: paid family leave policies. I
should say at the outset that I do not present this illustration as a
sample "success story" or even as evidence that my thesis is correct.
On the contrary, I believe (and we should predict) that it is too early
to know. But the case represents an opportunity to make some early
observations and isolate a number of research questions that would
177 In this vein, the disability rights movement has embraced the concept of the "temporarily able-bodied": We are all going to be disabled eventually. Martha Minow, Making
All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law 341 (1990) ("we able-bodied
persons are only temporarily able-bodied; we could all at some time return to the position
of dependence on others"); David Ferleger & Penelope A. Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization:
The Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 717, 742 n.107 (1979) (reporting that
disabled persons refer to the nondisabled with the acronym "TAP," which stands for "Temporarily Able-bodied Persons"); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 17 (arguing
that mobilizing around shared vulnerability across race and gender lines can be a way to
build coalitions for combating discrimination).
178 Gilens, note 139, at 45-52.
179 Id. at 49-50.
18o Id. at 48-50.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Tax law Review

2011]

CAN JOE THE PLUMBER SUPPORT REDISTRIBUTION?

359

help us in evaluating the strength of the universality-redistribution
thesis.
There is widespread consensus that balancing work and familyand in particular, managing work interruptions to care for members of
one's family-is one of the central challenges of contemporary American life. The major federal policy in this realm, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA),18 1 grants up to twelve weeks of jobprotected leave per year for workers who must take time off due to a
serious health condition, to care for a newborn, or to care for a family
member who has a serious health condition. 182 The FMLA does not
include wage replacement. In 2010, only 10% of private industry
workers had access to paid family leave,183 and about 20% had a limited number of "sick days" per year that could be used for family
care. 184
A common criticism of the FMLA is that many lower-income workers cannot take family leave, either because they are not covered by
the Act (which covers only about half of workers), or because they do
not have sufficient savings to afford a needed leave.185 Most of the
workers who do take leave are those who have employer-based wage
replacement, and these leave-takers are more educated, have higher
incomes, and are more likely to earn a salary (as opposed to hourly
wage) than those who do not take leave. Many workers who need
leave do not take it or cut it short, most commonly citing that they
cannot afford to suspend earnings.186 For years, scholars and policy
181 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1933, Pub L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 5 U.S.C.).
182 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
183Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employee Benefits Survey, Leave
Benefits: Access Data Table (Mar. 2010), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2010/owner
ship/private/table2la.htm.
18 About 62% of private industry workers are eligible for sick leave through private
employer plans, id., and an earlier study estimated that about 30% of workers have sick
leave plans that permit sick leave to be used for family care. Vicky Lovell, Inst. for Women's Pol'y Research, No Time to Be Sick: Why Everyone Suffers When Workers Don't
Have Paid Sick Leave, 9 tbl.3 (2004), http://www.iwpr.org/pdflB242.pdf.
185Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 Harv. J.L. Gender 1, 3 (2005);
Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 Berkeley. J.
Emp. Lab. L. 1, 41-46 (2007).
186 Roughly 13% of employees polled in a 2001 survey who reported needing to take a
leave did not take it. U.S. Dep't of Labor, FMLA Survey: Balancing the Needs of Families and Employers 2-2 tbl.2.1, 2-14 tbl.2.14 (2001), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/
archive/reports/fmla/chapter2.pdf. In a 2003 survey of employed workers in California,
18.4% reported that at some point in the previous five years, they did not take a leave
despite having wanted to do so. Ruth Milkman & Eileen Appelbaum, Paid Family Leave
in California: New Research Findings, The State of California Labor 2004, at 45, 57-58,
available at http://www.irle.ucla.edu/research/scl/pdf04/scl2004ch2.pdf.
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advocates have been advocating public provision of wage replacement
for family leave on a variety of normatiie grounds.187
Recently, there have been some major policy developments in this
domain. Since 1994, three states have enacted universal paid family
leave programs based on a social insurance model,188 and nine other
states are currently considering such proposals.' 89 There are also several federal bills or initiatives under debate.'9o These new policy developments can serve as a natural laboratory for studying the limits
and possibilities for redistribution within their boundaries. California's program is the furthest along and thus most helpful for purposes
of illustration.
California's Family Temporary Disability Insurance (FTDI) replaces 55% of the wages, for up to six weeks in any twelve-month
period, of workers who must take time off to care for seriously ill family members or bond with a new child.191 The benefit covers virtually
all private-sector workers.1 92 There is a floor on benefits of about $50

187 Some recent examples are Ariel Meysam Ayanna, Aggressive Parental Leave Incentivizing: A Statutory Proposal Toward Gender Equalization in the Workplace, 9 U. Penn.
J. Labor & Emp. L. 293 (2007); Lisa M. Keels, Family and Medical Leave Act, 7 Geo. J.
Gender & L. 1043, 1052 (2006). Workplace Flexibility 2010 & Berkeley Ctr. on Health,
Econ. & Family Sec., Family Security Insurance: A New Foundation for Economic Security (2010), available at http://familysecurityinsurance.org/. For a more comprehensive review, see Lester, note 185, at 1, 18-33.
188 Cal. Unempl. Ins. Code §§ 3300-3306 (West 2008); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.86 (2008);
2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 17 (West).
189 H.B. 2594, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011)(Arizona); H.B. 2258, 25th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Haw. 2010)(Hawaii); S.B. 71, 186 Gen. Court (Mass. 2009)(Massachusetts); H.B.
1940, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010)(Missouri); H.B. 661, 2009 Leg., 161st
Sess. (N.H. 2009)(New Hampshire); S.B. 5791, 232d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009)(New York);
H.B. 1558, 193d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009)(Pennsylvania); H.B. 1057, 81st Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009)(Texas); H.B. 672, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Va. 2010)(Virginia); see also
Nat'l P'ship for Women & Families, 2010 State Action on Paid Family and Medical Leave
(2010), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/PaidLeaveTrack
ing.pdf?doclD=1921.
190 Family Income to Respond to Significant Transitions (FIRST) Act, H.R. 2339, 111th
Cong. (2009); The Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009, H.R. 1723, 111th Cong. (2009); The
Family Leave Insurance Act of 2007, S. 1681, 110th Cong. § 306 (2007). In addition, President Obama's Fiscal Year 2012 budget proposal for the Department of Labor includes a
$23 million "State Paid Leave Fund" to assist states with the start-up costs associated with
developing paid leave programs. Dep't of Labor, FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justification, Employment and Training Administration, available at http://www.dol.gov/doll
budget/2012/PDF/CBJ-2012-V1-03.pdf.
191 Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 3301(a)-(d) (West 2008). Leaves to care for ill domestic
partners are included.
192 To be eligible, a worker need only to have earned $300 or more in any quarter during
the 5-17 months prior to filing a claim. Employer size is irrelevant. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code
§ 2610, 2652.
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per week, and a ceiling of about $1000 per week.193 Participation is
mandatory, although an employer may opt out of the program if it
offers a voluntary plan that is more generous than what the statute
requires. The benefit is financed by a payroll tax on employees up to
a set limit ($93,316 for 2011).194 The incremental tax imposed on each
employee to finance the benefit averages about 90 cents per week. 95
The question for present purposes is whether we might use this case
to focus our analysis of the influence of the psychological phenomena
I described earlier-reciprocity, groupism, and framing-and their
potential for generating public support, and ultimately, for achieving
redistribution. Consider first the process by which public support developed around the proposal. Based on the earlier analysis, one could
hypothesize that support for universal provision might be actuated
around the intense constraints that poor, middle-class, and wealthy
workers alike face in. balancing work and family. For low-income
workers, availability of benefits is limited or non-existent. For middleand high-income workers, the availability of private benefits through
the workplace is increasingly precarious. Possibilities are rife for common cause across income groups in support of paid leave insofar as it
promises to offer material resources for reconciling work and family.
In the period leading up to passage of the California legislation, active constituencies on both sides of the issue worked to frame the issue from their own perspective and to communicate this message to
the press and the public. The Berkeley Media Studies Group analyzed the content of approximately 300 news media pieces (television,
newspapers, magazines, and radio) covering California Senate Bill
1661 as debate intensified in the period surrounding the Governor's
signing the bill, from June 1 through October 31, 2002.196 The re193 For 2010, weekly benefits ranged between $50 and $987. Emp. Dev. Dep't, Disability
Insurance Benefits, http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/DIBenefitAmounts.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
194 Empl. Dev. Dep't, SDI Contribution Rates, http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/SDI
ContributionRates.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011); Emp. Dev. Dep't, State Disability Insurance-Quick Statistics (2011), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/AboutEDD/pdfl
qsdi-Taxable%20Wage%20Ceiling.pdf (providing a chart of the taxable wage ceiling from
1998-2010).
195 Because the tax that finances the benefit is part of the tax that finances state shortterm disability benefits, it is hard to know exactly the size of the incremental payroll tax
required to finance the benefit. In 2010, SDI (including FTDI) cost an average California
employee about $9 per week. Emp. Dev. Dep't, Average SDI Contributions (2010), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/about-edd/pdf/qsdi-AvgSDI-Contribution.pdf. FTDI
claims account for about 10% of total SDI benefit expenditures. My rough estimate assumes that the portion of the tax required to finance the benefit is directly proportional to
expenditures on the new program.
196 Making the Case for Paid Family Leave: How California's Landmark Law Was
Framed in the News (Berkeley Media Studies Grp., Berkeley, Cal.), Nov. 2003, available at
http://www.bmsg.org/pdfs/Issuel4.pdf.
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searchers identified a number of different "frames" that were used to
communicate the story, and counted their frequency of appearance. 197
They identified six frames supportive of the bill: "Caring family,
bonding moms" (which appeared in 69% percent of all media pieces),
emphasizing the importance of giving both men and women the opportunity to care for loved ones; 198 "Balancing work and family"
(41%), emphasizing painful conflict between family and job;199 "Business wins too" (27%), suggesting that paid family leave will help businesses profit; 200 "Make family leave real" (17%), decrying FMLA as
"a mirage" that most employees cannot afford to use; 201 "Corporate
family values" (9%), emphasizing that corporations have duties to
families and communities beyond (or despite) their primary goal to
make a profit;202 and Competitive advantage (6%), suggesting that
paid family leave benefits the state as a whole. 203
Opposing frames were "Unfair burden" (59%), an emotional appeal to the plight of struggling businesses; 204 "Competitive disadvantage" (30%), invoking an image of California losing jobs;205 "Tax on
jobs" (29%), invoking the idea that the law imposes an unfair tax on
employees because they cannot opt out;2 0 6 and "Nanny state/slippery
slope" (24%), a libertarian message that this legislation puts California on a slippery slope to a European-style paternalistic welfare
state. 207
It is noteworthy that the supportive frames most frequently invoked
by the media used universalizing themes of family love and care, and
painful conflict between being a good worker and a good family member: partner, son, or daughter. The supportive frame that emphasized
economic inequality was distinctly less prevalent, perhaps reflecting a
judgment on the part of media advocates that a "help for the poor"
message would not be as effective in generating public support. The
opposing frame that appeared most frequently highlighted the plight
of small business. Although the "nanny state" imagery invoked least
frequently suggests that opponents had at least some reason to believe
that segments of the public would respond to the threat of a "socialized" welfare state, absent were frames relating to irresponsibility, deId. at 6-10.
6.
6-7.
7.
201 Id. at 7-8.
202 Id. at 8.
203 Id.
2 Id. at 9.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 10.
197

198 Id. at
199 Id. at
200 Id. at

20

Id.
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pendency, or blameworthiness of people likely to benefit from the
program. Although much of the impetus for the legislation was concern about the economic struggles of those who lack savings or employer-based benefits, economic inequality did not become an
organizing schema for public debate. Similarly, concepts of "deservingness" did not play any role, contrary to the suggestion of researchers Martin Gilens and Shanto lyengar that they often do in debates
about means-tested anti-poverty programs. 208 Future research might
investigate whether the media covered other family policies during the
same time period in California that proposed more direct targeting of
poor populations. If so, it would be useful to see whether "blame
frames" 209 were more prevalent than they were during the paid leave
campaign.
The payroll tax financing, and broad contribution and eligibility requirements of FTDI might appeal to reciprocity norms in ways I discussed earlier. As explained in Part VI, however, reciprocity does not
necessitate progressivity. The question remains open as to whether,
over time, an increased tolerance for redistribution within the program might emerge. Currently, the tax is capped, making it regressive. Wage replacement is set at a fixed percentage of preleave
earnings (although there is a floor-a very low one-and a ceiling that
corresponds with the cap on the maximum wage base taxed). 210 Thus
the net tax and benefit structure is regressive.
Evidence that the public supported the program's creation with the
belief that it would effectuate redistribution would be very powerful,
but the success of my hypothesis that progressivity might emerge over
time does not depend on it. Flat benefits would have made the net
tax/benefit structure more progressive, but at the stage of initial introduction, wage-proportional benefits likely had more appeal for the
politically engaged public that debated passage of the law. The relatively high maximum benefit cap makes the benefit nontrivial for middle- and higher-income workers. If a flat benefit had been used
instead, its amount might have been capped at a relatively low level to
assuage concerns that high replacement rates would lead to moral
hazard at the lowest wage levels. The resulting benefit might have
been too low to generate significant public support.211 It remains to
See notes 146-49 and the accompanying text.
I borrow this term from Hanson & Hanson, note 151.
210 Emp. Dev. Dep't, Disability Insurance and Paid Family Leave Weekly Benefit
Amounts in Dollar Increments (2010), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf-pub-ctr/
de2589.pdf.
211 For example, implementation of the Washington state law is stalled because there has
been difficulty in agreeing on a funding mechanism. Some have speculated that at least
part of the difficulty is the unwillingness of the public to pay the proposed payroll tax in
208
209
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be seen whether, over time, there is the potential (or the will among
political elites) for making the tax-to-benefit ratio more progressiveperhaps 80% wage replacement for those in the lowest quintile of
earnings, 70% for the next quintile, and so forth-without raising significant resistance from participants concerned about unfairness or
moral hazard due to excessive replacement rates. 212
Public opinion polls conducted one year before, and one year after,
passage of the legislation found strong majority support for the idea of
paid leave. 213 Large majorities favored paid leave in virtually every
segment of the state's population, regardless of their gender, race or
ethnicity, nativity, education, or political orientation. 214 Questions
that the survey did not illuminate-but which would aid the present
endeavor-are whether support would change if respondents were
asked whether and how much they would be willing to pay to create
such a program, in what form of taxation, and whether and what ways
their support might vary depending on whether benefits were flat,
scaled to income, or graduated depending on income. It would be
possible to design a survey that raised these and other questions designed to illuminate participants' "tolerance for redistribution."
Whether the program might achieve income redistribution by virtue
of cross-subsidization within the risk pool is more complex, but also a
worthy subject for research. Assuming the mandated risk pool incorporates low-income workers who would be excluded from private coverage, if low-income participants were to make relatively more use of
the program than higher income workers, there might be an effective
transfer of resources between high- and low-income participants.
The possibility for this route to progressivity, however, would depend on take-up by low-income workers. Early polling data suggest
that take-up by low-income workers is disproportionately low. 2 1 5 The
the absence of more generous benefits. Caroline McConnell, Washington Stumbles Towards Landmark Paid Family Leave, Crosscut (Apr. 4, 2008), http://crosscut.com/2008/04/
04/social-services/13118/Washington-stumbles-toward-landmark-paid-family-leave.
An
amendment to the original Act was adopted in 2009 delaying the start date of the program
to October 1, 2012. S.B. 6158, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009); Wash Rev. Code
§ 49.86.030 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010).
212 There is currently a one-week waiting period, which operates like a deductible and
thus reduces moral hazard. Emp. Dev. Dep't, FAQs for Paid Family Leave, http://www.
edd.ca.gov/Disability/FAQs_for PaidFamilyLeave.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
213 Milkman & Appelbaum, note 186, at 52 (reporting results of 2003 survey in which
84.9% of respondents favored the idea of paid leave when asked, "Do you favor or oppose
the idea of a law that guarantees that eligible workers receive a certain portion of their pay
when they take family or medical leave?" and 2001-02 survey in which 78% favored the
idea).
214 Id. at 53.
215 A 2007 California Senate report found that workers earning less than $12,000 per
year made disproportionately few FTDI claims. Rona Levine Sheriff, Cal. Senate Office of
Research, Balancing Work and Family 7-10 (2007), available at http://www.sor.govof
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reason for this is uncertain, but one possible explanation is lack of
public awareness. A 2008-09 survey of employed California workers
who had experienced a life event that the program was designed to
cover (a new baby or seriously ill family member) found that only
about half (48.6%) were aware the program existed 216 and respondents from low-income households (households earning less than
$30,000) were about half as likely as other respondents to be aware of
the program. 217 Another possible reason for lack of take-up among
low-income workers is that for workers whose earnings just meet
monthly expenses, the 55% wage replacement rate is too low as a
practical matter to enable leave-taking. 218 A third explanation is that
many low-income workers are not covered by FMLA, and in the absence of job protection, some are afraid that if they take a leave they
will lose their jobs. 219 With 96% of California firms having less than
fifty employees, roughly 40% of workers who are eligible for FTDI
are ineligible for job restoration rights under the FMLA. 220
While the constraints on low-wage workers may be extreme, analogous constraints are hardly absent for middle-class workers. Many
middle income workers-not just low-income workers-lack access to
private policies to replace wages during family leaves, and operate on
family budgets that produce minimal savings and minimal discretionary income. 221 Thus the practical challenge of taking a leave for more
than a few days at 55% wage replacement may touch a nerve across
income groups. Will middle-class workers-even if they have no particular concern for their low-income compatriots-feel the impetus to
advocate for more generous benefits, such that all boats may rise?
This remains to be seen. My analysis suggests that public advocacy
efforts for improvements to the program over time might do well to
emphasize the importance of the issue for all Californians, not just the
poor.
fice3.com/vertical/Sites/%7B3BDD1595-792B-4D20-8D44-626EF05648C7%7D/uploads/
%7B76AE4BE5-6C7B-4FEE-922C-F2FED1DB376C%7D.PDF.
216 Eileen Appelbaum & Ruth Milkman, Leaves that Pay: Employer and Worker Experiences with Paid Family Leave in California 13 (2011) available at http://www.cepr.net/
documents/publications/paid-family-leave-1-2011.pdf.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 28 (discussing reasons given by respondents who did not take leaves even
though they believed they were eligible).
219 Id.
220 Author's calculations, based on data on employer-size distribution in Labor Mkt.
Info. Div., Emp. Dev. Dep't, Distribution of California Employment (2009), available at
http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/indsize/Chart SOB09_4.pdf.
221Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap: Why MiddleClass Mothers & Fathers Are Going Broke 8-11 (2003) (discussing decline over the past
several decades in the level of discretionary income available to middle-class families and
the resulting lack of financial buffer in the event of unexpected income interruption).
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A related issue is the extent to which the law will crowd-out (or
crowd-in) private paid leave policies, and if so, what distributional effects this might have. As discussed earlier, if a state mandate crowds
out existing provision, social welfare may or may not decline for those
who would have had access to private-employer benefits in the absence of the mandate (it would depend on the comparative cost and
quality of the old and new benefits). 222 Arguably, though, the broader
the cross-section of the public that comes to rely on the FFDI program for paid leave, the stronger the impetus for mobilizing around
program quality. The converse phenomenon-"crowd-in"-is also
possible. The passage of the law may lead employers that wish to be
"high road" employers to adopt policies that exceed the minimum requirements of the statute. 223 If this were to happen, it could redound
to the benefit of a broad cross-section of workers, or-conversely-it
could mean that a quality gap persists between "low" and "high" road
policies, leaving little impetus for workers who enjoy high-road policies to alter the new status quo. It is too early to gauge the presence
or valence of crowding by FTDI and any distributional impact such
crowding might have. Once again, however, the presence or absence
of crowding is a testable phenomenon, and a research question that
could shed light on the plausibility of my thesis.
A final comment about the California paid leave law is that it seems
likely that the prior existence in California of a temporary disability
social insurance program 224-Something that exists in only five states
and Puerto Rico2 25-Smoothed the way for FTDI. FTDI operated as
an incremental expansion of the temporary disability insurance program. Perhaps the very possibility of creating similar programs in
other states (assuming we were persuaded of their value) is tenuous
given the rarity of a suitable preexisting social insurance apparatus
(and normative mentality) on which to build. At the same time, we
See text accompanying notes 52-53.
See, e.g., Wen-Jui Han & Jane Waldfogel, Parental Leave: The Impact of Recent
Legislation on Parents' Leave Taking, 40 Demography 191, 196 (2003). This study of the
impact of unpaid leave mandates in state and federal law found an increase in the likelihood and duration of leaves taken by workers who were not beneficiaries of the mandate.
Id. The authors speculate that this reflects the following spillover effect: As the laws became more generous, so too did firms covered by the laws, extending benefits even to
workers they were not required to cover. Id; see also O'Leary, note 185, at 38 (reporting
federal survey data showing an increase in unpaid leave policies within exempt firms following passage of FMLA and speculating that the statute had a positive norm-creation
effect).
224 Act of Mar. 5, 1946, ch. 81, § 100, 1946 Cal. Stat. 101, 103 (codified as amended at
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 2601) (West 1986 & Supp. 2011).
225 See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, ch. 8 (2011),
available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2009/disability.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
222
223
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need not overstate the significance of the existing institutional structure. The program was not "slipped in under the radar" of an existing
program. Californians were asked to pay a new tax on their earnings
for a new, specific, purpose, a tradeoff about which the public debate
was very explicit. Moreover, Washington State's similar paid leave
legislation was created in the absence of any pre-existing similar social
insurance scheme, suggesting that an existing TDI infrastructure-or
mentality-was not essential. Instead, a more general emerging social
norm favoring income security for family care might be evolving.
This raises a larger issue of the reality that windows for major social
change require the alignment of contingencies that may be unique to
each policy context. My argument suggests that the initial framing effects for the public of being "in this together" and minimizing the
"otherness" of beneficiaries will be more likely to set the program on
a positive trajectory for sustained public support. Therefore a progressively motivated social planner should endeavor to start with universal provision, even if initially not redistributional, building in
greater progressivity over time. However, if as some scholars suggest,
institutional "lock-in" makes existing policies sticky, there may be advantages to working for incremental change from within existing
means-tested programs.
An example is the Children's Health Insurance (CHIP) program.
The program authorizes states to subsidize enrollment in private
health insurance plans for the children of low-income working parents. 226 While originally targeted only at very poor families, 227 President Obama signed legislation early in his presidency with the purpose
of both increasing take-up by existing targeted populations and expanding eligibility, including enabling states to raise the eligibility
threshold to include middle-income families. 228 Notwithstanding the
expansion into higher income groups, progressivity was built into the
new eligibility requirements, so that poorer enrollees will still receive
fuller coverage. It remains to be seen whether CHIP will expand still
further. During the period of debate leading up to reauthorization,
public opinion polls revealed support by a considerable majority for
program expansion, but later polls saw support fall to a slimmer ma-

42 U.S.C. § 1397aa-mm (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(a)(4) (2006) (requiring targeting of low-income children).
228 Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1113, 123 Stat. 8 (2009); see also Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Key Facts:
Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (2009) (explaining how
the new legislation enables expanded coverage into higher income cohorts), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7863.pdf.
226

227
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Moves to expand targeted benefits into less poor populations, especially if financing is non-contributory (that is, if it is funded
by general revenues) run the risk of exacerbating social cleavages if
public disagreements arise over "middle-class abuse" of the programs
and "undeserving" beneficiaries. 230 There is some flavor of this sentiment in at least some of the recent public discourse surrounding a
similar expansion of Medicaid as part of federal health care reform. 231
To summarize this Part, one can speculate on a number of ways in
which the motivational account developed in Part V could guide how
we think about the design of social insurance institutions. I have offered the example of California's recently adopted paid leave insurance program to illustrate the process-with emphasis on the
universalizing frame used by its advocates-that gave rise to a new
program of social insurance in the country's most populous state, although it remains to be seen what trajectory it will take over time in
terms of its progressivity. Although I do not offer other similarly detailed illustrations in this Article, paid leave is not the only area in
which my argument may have salience. Other ideas or initiatives in
recent years that would, to a greater or lesser degree, marshal universalism in the service of vertical redistribution include proposals for
establishment of child development accounts, 232 caretaker accounts, 233
229 A national poll released in October 2007, when the matter was being debated, found
that 65% of respondents favored reauthorization and expansion of CHIP. Nat'l Pub. Radio, Kaiser Family Found. & Harvard Sch. of Pub. Health, Public Views on SCHIP
Reauthorization 1 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7704.pdf. Another poll by the same organization released in January 2009 showed 51% support for
increased spending on CHIP. Kaiser Family Found. & Harvard Sch. of Pub. Health, The
Public's Health Care Agenda for the New President and Congress 5 (2009), available at
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7853.pdf.
230 See, e.g., Colleen M. Grogan & Eric M. Patashnick, Universalism Within Targeting:
Nursing Home Care, the Middle Class, and the Politics of the Medicaid Program, 77 Soc.
Serv. Rev. 51, 61, 65 (2003) (describing successful rhetorical appeals of Clinton administration to the needs of "middle class working people" to resist conservative Medicaid retrenchment initiatives, but simultaneous ambivalence of public and political elites about
the use of Medicaid by relatively well-off people); see also Soltermann, note 3, (arguing
against middle-class inclusion in Medicaid).
231 See, e.g., Emily Ramshaw & Marilyn Serafini, Battle Lines Drawn Over Medicaid in
Texas, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2010, at A21. The authors describe debates in several states
over whether to exercise their right to opt out of a provision in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act [ACA] that would require states to expand Medicaid rolls in exchange for a portion of available federal subsidies. State Representative Warren Chisum,
of Pampa, Texas, is quoted as saying, "If people are in superbad poverty, that's one thing,
[but] it breaks my heart when there's someone who smokes, and who stays drunk half the
time, and we're supposed to provide their health care."
232 Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 4-12, 155-77 (1999) (proposing $80,000 "stakeholder grants" for all Americans upon turning eighteen, emphasizing
the importance of their universality to the creation of national community, and financed by
a progressive tax); Deborah Adams, Ray Boshara, Margaret Clancy, Reid Cramer, Bob
Friedman, Rochelle Howard, Karol Krotki, Ellen Marks, Lisa Mensah, Bryan Rhodes,
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the movement for universal preschools, 234 and some varieties of the
school choice movement. 235 These examples do not follow the conventional social insurance model to which I have tailored my arguments, but there is a shared intuition in the core principles that drive
their combination of universal access and progressive financing. 236
VIII.

WELFARE STATE UNIVERSALISM AND "SOCIAL SOLIDARITY"

The analysis to this point has argued that prudent design of social
protections against economic insecurity-in particular, a preference
for universalist schemes that satisfy reciprocity norms and reduce the
salience of social cleavages-can reduce barriers to creation of social
programs that have the potential to achieve redistribution, whether or
not they start out that way. I further speculate on the possibility that
Carl Rist, Edward Scanlon, Leigh Tivol, Trina Williams Shanks & Robert Zager, Lessons
from SEED: A National Demonstration of Child Development Accounts (Michael Sherraden & Julia Stevens eds., Sept. 2010), available at http://assets.newamerica.net/sites/
newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lessons-from SEED.pdf (describing various recent U.S.
experiments with universal, progressive, trust funds for children that can be drawn upon
when the child turns eighteen for purposes of education, buying a home, or creating a
retirement account); David Kirp, Kids First: Five Big Ideas for Transforming Children's
Lives and America's Future 178-82 (2011) (advocating universal, progressive, child development accounts and discussing initiatives in Maine, Oklahoma, and the United Kingdom).
233 Anne L. Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children and What Society
Owes Parents 95-98 (2004) (proposing state-provided caretaker accounts for all parents,
with particular emphasis on the critical role of the rejection of means-testing as an allocation mechanism on grounds of liberal autonomy ideals, administrative efficiency, and political pragmatism).
234 See, e.g., Timothy J. Bartik, Distributional Effects of Early Childhood Programs and
Business Incentives and their Implications for Policy (Upjohn Inst., Working Paper No. 09151, 2009) (empirical analysis of projected distributional effects of targeted versus universal state-funded preschools).
235 See, e.g., Scott Franklin Abernathy, School Choice and the Future of American Democracy 111-13 (2005) (proposing state provision of universal scholarships for all schoolage children, financed by general revenues, to be used only for public school education,
and with a prohibition on the ability of any school to supplement resources by raising
money within the district through property taxes or private donations).
236 Another obvious area in which my analysis would seem relevant is in the recently
adopted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010). The health care debate is complicated because it combines questions about universal versus means-tested provision with questions about the state versus private actors as
the service provider of medical care. A stable large majority (-80%) of Americans believe
that health care should be a wholly or partially collective responsibility. Mark Schlesinger
& Jacob S. Hacker, Secret Weapon: The "New" Medicare as a Route to Health Security,
32 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 247, 252 fig.1 (citing data over a twenty-five-year period from
the General Social Survey). But Americans are deeply divided over the question of
whether the public sector or the private sector is the best agent for actual provision of
services. Id. at 254-56. This public-private divide interacts with the universalism versus
targeting debate in a way that makes it more difficult to discern what mix of factors is at
play in shaping public opinion. In light of this cross-cutting dynamic, I have largely sidestepped the health care debate in my analysis notwithstanding its policy currency.
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universalist design features will smooth the way for increased program
progressivity over time. The exercise, in essence, is one of creating the
conditions for the altruistic elements of people's rational utility function to dominate the self-interested elements. It is an optimizing exercise of sorts, assuming a prior normative commitment to achieving
redistribution.
The question in this Part is whether it is possible to do more than
this-to create conditions that might alter people's initial predilections. Might some kinds of welfare institutions alter the ratio of selfregarding to other-regarding impulses that comprise one's rational
utility function? It is possible-and many before me have arguedthat a kind of preference-shaping "social learning" might occur as a
consequence of the prevailing institutional context. Could universalistic social insurance against common social risks be one such context?
The notion that institutional form might generate social preferences
is more familiar within sociology, and economics in the institutional
vein, than it is within the mainstream public finance theory that dominates U.S. welfare policy. 237 The mid-twentieth century British social
theorists Richard Titmuss, T.H. Marshall, and R.H. Tawney theorized
a linkage between social bonds and broad-based government social
provision. Titmuss argued that Britons' second-world war experience
of a mass external threat created the psychological conditions-the
recognition of shared fate and the need to attend to all citizens-for
the creation of universalist social policy. 238 In this account causality
runs from an external shock, to the formation of solidarity, to the creation of welfare institutions that collectivize risk. 239
Titmuss and contemporaries, however, also advanced a distinct justification for universalist provision based on the (potentially) stronger
concept of social solidarity. Means-testing, Titmuss argued, weakens
the bonds of society by drawing distinctions between the worthy who
are self-sufficient and the unworthy who are not.240 T.H. Marshall,
237 Emile Durkheim famously asked "what bonds unite men to one another." Emile
Durkheim on Institutional Analysis 205 (Mark Traugott ed., trans. 1978). One of Durkheim's principle preoccupations was the question whether laws by which society binds itself
to cooperate are a manifestation of the moral impulse toward solidarity, or instead are
generative of solidarity.
238 Richard M. Titmuss, War and Social Policy, in The Philosophy of Welfare: Selected
Writings of Richard M. Titmuss 102, 111-12 (Brian Abel-Smith & Kay Titmuss eds., 1987).
239 For a recent argument in a similar vein, see William P. Quigley, What Katrina Revealed, 2 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 361, 376-80 (2008) (arguing that the Katrina disaster, by
making people recognize shared vulnerability, was a lightening rod for formation of social
solidarity, and that this solidarity should in turn be marshaled in the service of advocating
the creation or expansion of accountable public programs designed to support community
rebuilding).
240 Richard M. Titmuss, Universal and Selective Social Services, in Philosophy of Welfare, note 238, at 128, 128-31.
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elaborating on his concept of "social citizenship" in his famous lectures on "Citizenship and Social Class" defended universal welfare
provision as follows:
What matters is that there is a general enrichment of the
concrete substance of civilised life, a general reduction of
risk and insecurity, an equalisation between the more and
the less fortunate at all levels-between the healthy and the
sick, the employed and the unemployed, the old and the active, the bachelor and the father of a large family. Equalisation is not so much between classes as between individuals
within a population which is now treated for this purpose as
though it were one class....
Even when benefits are paid in cash, this class fusion is
outwardly expressed in the form of a new common experience. All learn what it means to have an insurance card that
must be regularly stamped (by somebody), or to collect children's allowances or pensions from the post office. 241
Titmuss and Marshall were not simply positing that universalist social policy reflected solidarity; they distinctly argued that universalism
could foster a normatively desirable perception of common experience, emphasizing mutual, rather than competing, interests of taxpayers and beneficiaries. 24 2
Some contemporary U.S. scholars express a similar view. For example, Tom Baker argues that the design of insurance institutions can
affect social attitudes, in particular the degree to which individuals
facing risk feel social solidarity, in the form of mutual responsibility
for one another. 243 More tightly actuarial insurance-in which higherrisk participants are excluded-argues Baker, is less conducive to generating this kind of mutual responsibility. 244 Deborah Stone argues
that insurance (both private and public), because it pools risk within a
community, reinforces norms of altruism, collective responsibility, and
mutual aid. 245 Citizens, she contends, cannot escape the implicit
Marshall, note 19, at 56.
Richard M. Titmuss, Social Welfare and the Art of Giving, in Philosophy of Welfare,
note 238, at 113, 115-24; S.M. Miller, Introduction: The Legacy of Richard Titmuss, in
Philosophy of Welfare, note 238, at 1, 13-14.
243 E.g., Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in
Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility 33, 46 (Tom
Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (design of insurance, particularly degree of actuarialism, crucial to the social construction of responsibility and social solidarity).
244 Id.
245 See, e.g., Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, in
Embracing Risk, note 243, at 52, 61-63 (2002).
241

242
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moral lesson of altruism and collective responsibility inherent in social
insurance "no matter how much they chafe under mandatory

participation." 246
A variant on this argument is that cross-class benefits may lead to
social learning, as better-off people come to recognize their common
humanity with others who share a common need for security against
risk.2 4 7 Meredith Rosenthal and Norman Daniels make this kind of
argument about the empathy-generating (as well as norm-setting) possibility of universal health insurance. They argue:
The attitudes people have toward seeking collective solutions to social problems are in part a product of the institutions that they encounter. People embedded in social
insurance schemes tend to sustain attitudes of social solidarity, believing sharing risks is a social obligation. Of course,
cultures with social insurance schemes may have had deeper
commitment to social solidarity to start with, but the stability
of these institutions over the long run in many countries suggests they help shape attitudes, as well. American commitment toward solidarity in our Social Security and Medicare
schemes-the "third rail" of politics-may be sustained by
the benefits produced by the collective sharing of risks.248
Skocpol uses similar arguments in defense of more universalistic social policy:
Universalistic policies would also change the attitudes of
more privileged Americans, which returns us to the bedrock
matter of broad and sustainable support for antipoverty policies .... If and when new public social policies begin to help
American families from all social classes and all racial and
ethnic groups to meet contingencies of ill health, job loss,
and the challenges of balancing paid work and parental responsibilities, then a "kinder and gentler" political nation
might actually emerge. With their own values and needs recognized through a revitalized public sector, larger numbers
246 Id. at 63; see also Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22
Law & Soc'y Rev. 771 (1988).
247 See, e.g., Albert Weale, Equality, Social Solidarity and the Welfare State, 100 Ethics
473 (1990).
248 Meredith Rosenthal & Norman Daniels, Beyond Competition: The Normative Implications of Consumer-Driven Health Plans, 31 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 671, 681-82
(2006); see also Tony Prosser, Regulation and Social Solidarity, 33 J. L. & Soc'y 364, 383
(2006) (arguing for universal state provision of health and education services as a means of
"regulating for social solidarity" and reducing social fragmentation).
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of middle-class American citizens would be prepared to go
the extra mile for especially needy minorities. 249
These theorists seem to suggest that universal provision can lead to
more permanent social change through recognition of common humanity-a kind of empathy-generative social learning process. 250 In
all of these writings, however, the psychological mechanism by which
this solidarity might emerge is only vaguely specified. How, exactly,
would it work?
One hypothesis is that universal programs can lead to the social integration of middle-class and low-income people who physically interact through their involvement in a public program. This story has
resonance in the context of something like public education, where
public provision has doubtless reduced segregation as compared with
an alternative, hypothetical world without public education. Face-toface interaction between children and adults whose economic, ethnic
or racial, and neighborhood differences would otherwise erect social
barriers might-notwithstanding its quasi-compulsory nature 251-facilitate friendships, trust, and empathy through cooperative involvement in school events and collaboration around educational values
and policy. We might recast this story about face-to-face interaction
through schools (or health clinics, nursing homes, or childcare facilities, for that matter) in terms of its cognitive foundations. Provision
of services on equal terms to the poor and nonpoor so that people are
physically using the same services might diminish the perception of
group distance. A diminished perception of group status might facilitate deeper fellow-feeling between citizens. Certain other aspects of
public life resonate along this dimension-jury service, military service, market employment, some aspects of political participation. 252
The puzzle is what relevance (if any) this hypothesis holds for public insurance. Some, to be sure, but the case would seem uneasy. Social insurance programs do not, for the most part, require any face-toface interaction between citizens. Although some programs require
249 Skocpol, note 84, at 272.

250 See also John J. Rodger, Social Solidarity, Welfare and Post-Emotionalism, 32 J. Soc.
Pol'y 403, 412-13 (2003) (arguing that the weakening of state involvement in welfare policy
that promotes reciprocal social and economic dependence between all social classes may
lead to social divisions and "post-emotional" society in which the plight of the disadvantaged is manifested intellectually rather than with sincere emotion or empathy).
251I say quasi-compulsory because independent schools are an option for some, but not
all, citizens.
252 I do not mean to suggest that face-to-face interaction across group lines will always
lead to harmony and solidarity between groups, but rather that there is genuine potential
for such integration to occur. For a thoughtful analysis of how compulsory workplace affiliations might instill intergroup social ties, see Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: How
Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy 74-83 (2003).
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beneficiaries to work with someone from the administrative agency
(caseworker, unemployment counselor), this is not the same as faceto-face interaction between participants in the pool of contributors
and beneficiaries. Technological change has meant that Marshall's
ideal of fellowship borne of the shared necessity of going to the post
office to collect a pension check is no longer a descriptive reality. Cash
transfers can happen through direct deposit in one's bank account.
Still, even the relatively interpersonal arms-length context of universal
social insurance can give rise to forms of community. 253
To again situate this argument within the cognitive phenomena this
Article has described, one could imagine a process by which preference-altering social learning could happen in connection with participation in a program of universal welfare benefits. This process would
go beyond simply "institutionally framing" social choices to encourage
the dominance of people's other-regarding over self-regarding preferences from within some fixed underlying mix of preferences that comprises their utility function. It might be possible to alter their
dispositions-change the "mix."
Suppose a universal social insurance program is establishedlargely fueled by median voters' self-interested motives. Certain reciprocity features are built into the program to facilitate trust and encourage buy-in: contribution requirements and selective mechanisms
to regulate over-use. Suppose the system works: People see ways in
which the program offers common security for themselves and others
who occupy different social positions. People recognize improvements in overall social conditions that they associate with the program
and come to more fully recognize their value. People's confidence in
the program increases. Feeling this greater confidence, they feel more
unity with other participants in their collective stewardship of the project. In this context, the salience of common group status with other
participants as beneficiaries and stewards of the program dominates
other aspects of their identity. Their judgment of the fairness of the
distributional aspects of the program feels different now-not simply
because of how their preferences are "cued" but because they feel
they have learned something about the legitimacy of the program and
other participants. The prospect of building more progressivity into
253 See Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community
and their Normative Significance 27-30, 38-40 (2000) (describing what he calls a "moralized
concept of community" involving mutual concern among members and absence of exploitation, and yet not requiring face-to-face interaction, an example of which might be a
welfare state funded through compulsory taxation); Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Social Cohesion
and Economic Prosperity 132-35 (2001) (arguing that social insurance, as a collective act by
citizens in protecting each other against risks, can bind participants to each other, generate
a feeling of belonging, and generate social cohesion).
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the program does not seem unfair, and perhaps the prospect of expanding the range of programs that collectivize risk and redistribute
income does not seem as threatening as it once did.
All of these things are possible. True, the story could unfold differently-public confidence could erode if a program were poorly designed or managed. My point is not to say that universal social
insurance will always and inevitably lead to the evolution of more altruistic social preferences. But I have traced a plausible process by
which it could.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have drawn a connection between institutionalist
theories from sociology and political science as to why universalistic
welfare policy might accomplish more redistribution than selective
policy, and research in economics and psychology on the complexity
of motives, in particular on the conditions under which people are
willing to support redistribution. I do not claim that other explanations-cultural forces, racial legacies, material self-interest, institutional "lock-in"-have no explanatory power. On the contrary, it is
plausible that each of these explanations does some work, and it is
hard to speculate on their relative weight.
My argument is simply that phenomena operating at the cognitive
level might also do significant work: Namely, welfare institutions designed around more universal distribution of benefits might serve as
an "institutional frame" that increases support for-or at least reduces
opposition to-redistribution within a universal scheme. It might do
so by reinforcing reciprocity norms, reducing the salience of in-group
favoritism along class and race lines, and by reducing the scope of
public debate about the distinction between "deserving" and "undeserving" beneficiaries of public aid. More ambitiously, but also more
speculatively, I conjecture that more universalist institutions for managing common social risks might establish the foundations for social
learning that alters preferences more permanently over time.
Despite the necessarily tentative nature of my analysis, the intersection between positive political theory, behavioral science, and theories
of social solidarity is an important and neglected area of inquiry. At
the very least, this Article has aimed to increase awareness of its possibilities for fruitful application to social policy design.
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